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ABSTRACT 
 In this study, I examine the influence of construals (interpretations) and mindsets 
on professional skepticism in auditors.  Auditors have been criticized lately for not 
displaying enough professional skepticism, particularly in their audits of complex 
estimates (PCAOB 2008).  Regulators speculate about and academic research shows a 
correlation between low professional skepticism and both audit failures and audit 
malpractice claims (Beasley et al. 2001; Anderson and Wolfe 2002).  I hypothesize that 
prolonging the deliberative mindset in the audit judgment and decision-making process 
can increase professional skepticism in auditors. 
 Experienced auditors take part in a 1 x 3 between-participants experiment in 
which they play the role of a senior auditor charged with evaluating a client’s fair value 
estimate.  I manipulate the type of mindset (deliberative or implemental) invoked by the 
evidence documentation instructions and have a third condition in which participants do 
not have to document audit evidence.  Using multiple measures of professional 
skepticism, I find that auditors in the deliberative mindset condition display higher 
professional skepticism than both auditors in the implemental mindset condition and 
auditors in the no documentation condition.  I further analyze the types of textual 
responses entered by the auditors and offer direction for future research in this area.      
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Questions and Motivation 
The purpose of this study is to explore whether and how different mindsets 
influence professional skepticism.  Professional skepticism, an attitude characterized by 
objectivity and a questioning mind, is a central tenet in the auditing standards (AU 230).  
Recently auditors have been criticized for not displaying enough professional skepticism, 
particularly in their audits of complex estimates (PCAOB 2008; Bratten et al. 2013).  
Prior studies correlate a lack of professional skepticism with both audit failures and audit 
malpractice claims (Beasley et al. 2001; Anderson and Wolfe 2002).   
 Gollwitzer (1990) and Gollwitzer and Bayer (1999), based on earlier work by 
Heckhausen (1986), describe two mindsets individuals enter before taking actions: the 
deliberative mindset and the implemental mindset.  Individuals in a deliberative mindset 
are deciding whether to take an action while individuals in an implemental mindset are 
thought to be planning an action (Freitas et al. 2004). Figure 1 displays Heckhausen’s 
(1986) original model.  Prior research in psychology associates the deliberative mindset 
with objectivity and high-level (abstract) interpretations of evidence or alternatives 
(Gollwitzer 1990; Gollwitzer et al. 1990; Gollwitzer and Bayer 1999).  Studies in 
psychology show that objectivity becomes greatly diminished when an individual enters 
the implemental mindset, as the individual becomes decided on a given action 
(Gollwitzer 1990; Gollwitzer et al. 1990; Gollwitzer and Bayer 1999; Freitas et al. 2004). 
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I address two research questions in this study.  First, how do the deliberative and 
implemental mindsets affect an auditor’s professional skepticism?  Second, what effect 
will an intervention designed to prolong the deliberative mindset have on professional 
skepticism?  Currently there is little empirical evidence that being in a deliberative 
mindset will have an effect on judgments and actions that would be indicative of 
professional skepticism.1   
Once decided upon an action, an individual focuses on evidence or alternatives 
that favor the chosen action (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones 2002).  Prior accounting 
research documents an analog to this effect that occurs when auditors have directional 
goals of pleasing their clients.  Several studies note that auditors have a tendency to side 
with their clients, and this tendency leads to a biased search for and processing of audit 
evidence (Lundgren and Prislin 1998; Hackenbrack and Nelson 1998; Kadous et al. 2003; 
Montague 2010).  The auditor behavior observed in these studies is consistent with the 
notion that auditors could be prone to moving directly into an implemental mindset, an 
act consistent with Gollwitzer’s (1990) suggestion that the deliberative mindset can be 
bypassed.   
 Since professional skepticism could be reduced, if not eliminated, upon entry into 
the implemental mindset, keeping an auditor within the deliberative mindset for as long 
as possible could increase professional skepticism.  Theoretically, auditors kept in a 
deliberative mindset will stay objective longer, which should increase their professional 
                                               
1 One possible exception is Taylor and Gollwitzer (1995) which shows that individuals in a deliberative 
mindset are more likely to attend to risk factors than are individuals in an implemental mindset.  The study 
does not, however, explore how individuals act on those risk factors or how their judgments could be 
affected by those risk factors. 
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skepticism and help combat biases such as the tendency to side with the client described 
above.  For example, in an audit of a complex estimate, an auditor who maintains a 
deliberative mindset longer should have a more objective search for and processing of 
audit evidence than one who moves into an implemental mindset early in the audit 
process.  Further, Taylor and Gollwitzer (1995) show that individuals in a deliberative 
mindset are more likely to attend to risk factors than are individuals in an implemental 
mindset.  This finding suggests that auditors who move into an implemental mindset 
early could have trouble assessing audit risks. 
Prior research using construal level theory offers suggestions on how the 
deliberative mindset can be maintained.  Construal level theory espouses the idea of 
psychological distance, the general feeling of how close (or far) an individual believes 
himself to be from something (Trope and Liberman 2010).2  A deliberative mindset 
generally relates to high psychological distance (akin to objectivity in this context) while 
an implemental mindset has been associated with low psychological distance (Fujita et al. 
2006; Fujita et al. 2007; Rim et al. 2009).   
Trope and Liberman (2003; 2010) suggest that increased psychological distance 
can be achieved by processing information with high-level construals (interpretations).  
High-level construals are abstract, simple, and structured.  For example, a high-level 
construal of the act of conducting a research study is that the researcher is “advancing 
science” (Trope and Liberman 2003, 405).  In contrast, low-level construals are detailed, 
complex, and unstructured.  A low-level construal of the act of conducting a research 
                                               
2 Note that “distance” in this theory relates not only to physical distance but also to other concepts such as 
temporal distance (how soon something will happen) and social distance (how close an individual feels to 
another emotionally) (Trope and Liberman 2003; 2010). 
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study is that the researcher is “testing a hypothesis,” or “entering the data collected this 
morning” (Trope and Liberman 2003, 405).3  Prior accounting research demonstrates that 
processing information with high-level construals can help an auditor curb a client’s 
aggressive reporting behavior (Backof et al. 2011). 
Considering audit evidence with high-level construals should enable an auditor to 
increase the psychological distance between himself and the audit evidence.  High-level 
construals can increase psychological distance because they allow an individual to view 
information in a more abstract form which increases objective processing of both positive 
and negative information (Trope and Liberman 2003; 2010; Fujita et al. 2007).  The 
increased psychological distance should allow the auditor to remain in a deliberative 
mindset longer which will help maintain the auditor’s objectivity, thus promoting 
professional skepticism.   
Considering audit evidence with low-level construals, however, could lead to 
directional, biased processing of the evidence, potentially inhibiting professional 
skepticism.  Low-level construals focus on specific, detailed aspects of information 
making it harder for individuals to consider alternatives to that information (Trope and 
Liberman 2003; Fujita et al. 2007).  Processing information with low-level construals 
would be detrimental to the audit process because such processing could enable the 
auditor to work towards a specific goal such as the goal of pleasing the client or 
confirming the client’s position rather than remain objective (Gollwitzer 1990; Gollwitzer 
and Bayer 1999; Freitas et al. 2004).  
                                               
3 In an auditing context, an example of a high-level construal of auditing would be that auditors are 
providing assurance.  An example of a low-level construal of auditing would be any of the specific 
procedures conducted during the course of the audit. 
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Prior psychology research describes mechanisms that can move individuals into 
an implemental mindset or otherwise decrease psychological distance.  One of these 
mechanisms consists of having an individual generate specific examples from things like 
a category of objects or an intended plan of action (Taylor and Gollwitzer 1995; Fujita et 
al. 2006; Rim et al. 2009).  An analog of this mechanism in audit practice is the 
documentation requirement.  In the context of the audit of a complex estimate, auditors 
will document the specific reasons why they either confirmed the client’s estimate or why 
they recommended an adjustment of the estimate.   
If an auditor begins the documentation process early then the process could move 
the auditor into an implemental mindset before he has fully considered all of the available 
audit evidence.  An implemental mindset does not foster objective processing of evidence 
and could exacerbate the problem of auditors tending to side with their clients to the 
extent that the remaining audit evidence is accumulated and processed with directional 
goals (such as pleasing the client) in mind (Gollwitzer 1990; Lundgren and Prislin 1998; 
Hackenbrack and Nelson 1998; Kadous et al. 2003; Montague 2010).   Further, 
individuals in an implemental mindset have more trouble evaluating risk factors than do 
individuals in a deliberative mindset (Taylor and Gollwitzer 1995).  Thus, the audit 
documentation process, in its current form, could be inhibiting both professional 
skepticism and an auditor’s ability to make effective risk assessments. 
I hypothesize that auditors in an implemental mindset will display lower levels of 
professional skepticism than will auditors in either a deliberative mindset or auditors that 
are not placed into a specific mindset.  A finding that auditors in an implemental mindset 
display less professional skepticism than auditors not placed into a specific mindset will 
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serve as evidence that the documentation requirement potentially inhibits professional 
skepticism.  I further hypothesize that auditors kept in a deliberative mindset will display 
the highest levels of professional skepticism. 
1.2 Research Design 
To test these hypotheses, I use an experiment designed to help illuminate the 
relation between psychological distance, mindsets and professional skepticism.  I use a 1 
x 3 between-participants design with the following three conditions: deliberative mindset 
condition, implemental mindset condition, and no documentation condition.  My 
participants are auditors with experience auditing complex estimates. 
The participants take part in a simulated audit of a complex estimate, namely a 
fair value estimate.  Each participant receives background information on the client and 
the task and receives several pieces of evidence pertinent to the audit.  Although the 
evidence items include positive (supporting the client’s estimate), neutral, and negative 
(disconfirming the client’s estimate) evidence, I balance the evidence such that the ratio 
is 1:2:2 of positive, neutral, and negative evidence items, respectively.  The negative 
evidence collectively suggests that the client’s estimate is at the upper end of a reasonable 
range of the estimate.  This setting is one that should call for increased professional 
skepticism. 
I ask participants in the deliberative mindset condition to broadly consider the 
evidence and write down a broad summary of the evidence.  Consistent with prior 
research, broad consideration of the evidence should help the participants to maintain a 
deliberative mindset and increase the psychological distance between the participants and 
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the evidence (Fujita et al. 2006; Rim et al. 2009; Backof et al. 2011).  I ask participants in 
the implemental mindset condition to consider and write down specific reasons why the 
client’s estimate is either fairly stated or misstated.  This act should serve to push the 
participants into an implemental mindset and decrease the psychological distance 
between the participants and the evidence (Fujita et al. 2006; Rim et al. 2009; Backof et 
al. 2011).  I design the implemental mindset condition to mimic the audit practice of 
documenting specific reasons why an auditor chooses a particular action.  Participants in 
the no documentation condition are not required to document evidence and therefore 
receive no instructions.   
In theory and as codified in the accounting standards, auditors should be objective 
throughout the audit process.  If objectivity is associated with the deliberative mindset 
then auditors should begin with a deliberative mindset and stay in that mindset for as long 
as possible.  However, given the biases displayed by auditors described above coupled 
with the idea that the deliberative mindset can be bypassed (Gollwitzer 1990), I cannot be 
certain in which mindset participants will begin.  With respect to the Heckhausen (1986) 
shown in Figure 1, I expect the experimental interventions to have poignantly different 
effects on an auditor’s mindset.  As shown in Figure 2, the instructions designed to 
invoke a deliberative mindset should theoretically increase the time an auditor remains in 
a deliberative mindset while the instructions designed to invoke an implemental mindset 
should increase the time an auditor is in an implemental mindset (at the cost of time in 
the deliberative mindset).4  
                                               
4 I am grateful to Billy Brink for suggesting this figure. 
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I next ask the participants whether they wish to continue searching for additional 
evidence relative to the fair value audit.  I consider additional searching to be consistent 
with increased professional skepticism.  Participants that elect to continue searching 
receive new pieces of evidence that again suggest that the client’s estimate is at the upper 
bound of a reasonable range for the fair value estimate.  Upon viewing the new evidence, 
the participants are again subjected to their experimental manipulations and can decide to 
continue searching for new evidence. 
After the participants decide they have viewed enough evidence, they are asked a 
series of questions regarding the task.  The questions include an assessment of the risk of 
a material misstatement in the client’s estimate and an indication of the likelihood of 
whether or not the participant would recommend an adjustment to the estimate.  An 
increase in professional skepticism would be demonstrated by a) an increased level of 
searching for audit evidence; b) an increased assessment of risk; and/or c) an increase in 
the likelihood of recommending an audit adjustment. 
The post-experimental questionnaire (PEQ) captures other important variables 
and possible covariates.  The PEQ includes the 30-question Hurtt (2010) professional 
skepticism scale that is designed to capture trait professional skepticism.5  I also include a 
test derived from Fujita et al. (2006) that helps detect whether the participant is thinking 
in terms of high-level construals or low-level construals which will serve as evidence of 
the success or failure of the experimental manipulations. 
                                               
5 Hurtt (2010) describes two types of professional skepticism: state and trait.  Trait professional skepticism 
is a person’s innate skeptical nature that remains constant over time.  State professional skepticism can vary 
with each unique situation. 
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The focus of the analysis is on the level of professional skepticism displayed by 
participants in the deliberative mindset condition compared with the level displayed by 
participants in the other two conditions.  I predict that a higher level of professional 
skepticism will be displayed by the deliberative mindset participants.  Independent coders 
are used to help establish whether the participants’ responses are indicative of high-level 
or low-level construals.  I use the pattern displayed by the coding to see if I can determine 
when the shift to the implemental mindset occurs.6   
Further, I contrast the level of professional skepticism displayed by participants in 
the implemental mindset condition with the level displayed by participants in the no 
documentation condition.  I hypothesize that participants in the implemental mindset 
condition will display a lower level of professional skepticism.  Such a result would 
potentially indicate that the current practice of documenting evidence inhibits 
professional skepticism.  This finding combined with a finding that participants in the 
deliberative mindset condition displayed the highest level of professional skepticism 
would suggest that the current practice of documentation could be altered slightly to 
improve professional skepticism.   
1.3 Results and Contribution 
Consistent with my first hypothesis, I find that auditors given instructions 
designed to invoke a deliberative mindset display higher professional skepticism than do 
auditors given instructions designed to invoke an implemental mindset and auditors not 
                                               
6 As discussed in the fourth section, responses indicative of high-level construals are coded as +1 while 
responses indicative of low-level construals are coded as -1.  I theorize that a shift in the pattern from 
responses coded positive to responses coded negative marks the shift from the deliberative mindset to the 
implemental mindset.  Unfortunately, I did not have enough data to report on this proposition.  Please see 
section 4.7 for further details. 
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receiving documentation instructions.  Auditors in the deliberative mindset condition 
spent more time searching for and reviewing audit evidence, spent more time on the 
study, assessed higher risks that management’s estimate contains a material misstatement, 
and indicated a higher likelihood that they would recommend an adjustment of 
management’s estimate than did auditors in the implemental mindset and no 
documentation conditions.  Auditors in the deliberative mindset condition also conducted 
more searches for evidence than did auditors in the implemental mindset condition, but 
not more than participants in the no documentation condition.  These results contribute to 
psychology and auditing theory by establishing a relation between psychological 
distance, mindsets, and professional skepticism.   
My results can be useful for academics, regulators and practitioners in several 
different ways.  First, I show that auditors should consider evidence with broad 
interpretations of the evidence rather than consider specific examples of audit evidence as 
required under the current auditing standards (PCAOB 2004).  Second, my results can be 
useful to those seeking to create a judgment model that can aid auditors in their 
evaluations of complex client estimates (SEC 2008).   
Third, I answer a call for research by Bratten et al. (2013) to examine task specific 
factors that can affect an auditor’s ability to filter management bias in judgments related 
to complex estimates.  I show that instructions designed to invoke a deliberative mindset 
and consider the “why” of the situation can assist an auditor in breaking through 
management bias and preferences to side with the client’s estimate.  My results suggest 
that auditors in a deliberative mindset condition will be more likely to consider audit 
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evidence collectively and better impound the negative information which some auditors 
fail to see (Griffith et al. 2012). 
Additionally, I provide evidence supporting the problems discussed by Bratten et 
al. (2013) and Christensen et al. (2012) relating to the difficulty of the task of auditing 
complex estimates.  Auditors in the deliberative mindset condition rated the experimental 
task as being significantly more difficult than auditors in the implemental mindset and no 
documentation conditions.  I document a possible consequence of this difference in the 
finding that auditors in the deliberative mindset condition did not conduct more searches 
for evidence than auditors in the no documentation group despite showing higher 
professional skepticism through the other measures. 
I suggest that auditors in the deliberative mindset condition might have ended 
their search for evidence prior to the maximum number of searches allowed because of 
the increase in perceived complexity.  Auditors in the no documentation condition, 
despite being apparently less skeptical, could have continued their search for evidence 
simply because it was less cognitively taxing for them to do so since they did not have to 
document evidence.  Future research can examine this conjecture that task complexity 
and professional skepticism are negatively related. 
Fourth, this study continues the exploration of “state,” or situational, professional 
skepticism called for by Hurtt (2010).  By linking professional skepticism with mindsets, 
I show that an auditor’s state professional skepticism can be heightened by prolonging 
the deliberative mindset.  The auditors participating in my study do not significantly 
differ in their levels of trait, or permanent, professional skepticism; thus, according to 
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Hurtt (2010), the differences in professional skepticism displayed by my auditor 
participants must be due to differences in their state professional skepticism.  My results 
provide evidence that state professional skepticism can be altered through task-specific 
factors.  The results also suggest that the deliberative mindset intervention can be useful 
in freeing auditors from the bias towards siding with their client (Hackenbrack and 
Nelson 1996; Peecher 1996; Haynes et al. 1998; Kadous et al. 2003) since it helps 
auditors maintain a more objective mindset when evaluating audit evidence.   
Interestingly, I fail to show that auditors given instructions designed to invoke an 
implemental mindset display lower professional skepticism than do auditors not receiving 
documentation instructions.  A possible reason for this lack of a finding is that auditors 
are currently required to consider and document evidence with specific, detailed 
responses (PCAOB 2004).  Thus, even though auditors in the no documentation condition 
did not have to document evidence, they still considered the evidence as they would in a 
normal audit situation in which they would be required to document evidence.  This 
result highlights the importance of changing the manner in which auditors consider and 
document audit evidence. 
 Finally, I find strong support for my third set of hypotheses that predicts a relation 
between the types of responses entered as audit documentation and auditor mindset.  
Auditors in the deliberative mindset condition entered broad, abstract responses a greater 
percentage of the time than did auditors in the implemental mindset condition.  By 
extension, auditors in the implemental mindset condition entered specific, detailed 
responses a greater percentage of the time.  This finding helps to solidify the relation 
between mindsets, psychological distance, and professional skepticism. 
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 In terms of contribution, the results for Hypothesis 3 help open up the black box 
of professional skepticism.  From these results we can potentially derive an ex post 
measure of professional skepticism that can be used to chart an auditor’s level of 
professional skepticism at given points during an audit.  For example, audit 
documentation can be examined to see what types of responses are entered during various 
stages of the audit, which can help reviewers and regulators establish whether the auditor 
was in a mindset conducive to professional skepticism during those stages.  Future 
research will be useful in adapting the results of this paper into this potential measure and 
can be used to test the efficacy of the measure.  
 
 Figure 1 – Heckhausen’s (1986) Self-Regulation Phases 
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Figure 2 – Theoretical Effects of Documentation Instructions  
Deliberative Mindset
Implemental 
Mindset
Take Action
Deliberative Mindset
Implemental 
Mindset
Take Action
Deliberative 
Mindset
Implemental 
Mindset
Take Action
15 
 
 
 
 
2.0 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Professional Skepticism 
 Skepticism “is a manifestation of objectivity, holding no special concern for 
preconceived conclusions on any side of an issue” (Louwers et al. 2011, 16).  According 
to the auditing standards, professional skepticism “is an attitude that includes a 
questioning mind and a critical assessment of audit evidence” (AU 230.07).  The standard 
further describes that “the auditor neither assumes that management is dishonest nor 
assumes unquestioned honesty.  In exercising professional skepticism, the auditor should 
not be satisfied with less than persuasive evidence because of a belief that management is 
honest” (AU 230.09). 
 Academics are not uniform in their interpretation of professional skepticism.  
Nelson (2009) recently reviewed the literature on professional skepticism and found that 
researchers interpret professional skepticism in at least two different ways.  Some 
maintain that the standards promote a “neutral” perspective of skepticism.  For example, 
Hurtt (2010, 151) defines professional skepticism as “a multi-dimensional construct that 
characterizes the propensity of an individual to defer concluding until the evidence 
provides sufficient support for one alternative/explanation over others.” 
 Other researchers promote a “presumptive doubt” interpretation of professional 
skepticism.  For example, Shaub (1996) promotes the idea that skepticism is the opposite 
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of trust, or suspicion.  Both Bell et al. (2005) and Nelson (2009) believe that relatively 
recent additions to the auditing standards, including SAS No. 57 (AU 342, Auditing 
Accounting Estimates) and SAS No. 99 (AU 316, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial 
Statement Audit), promote a “presumptive doubt” interpretation of professional 
skepticism because these standards reference fraud and management bias. 
 Regulators also appear to have adopted the “presumptive doubt” perspective.  The 
SEC, and more specifically the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), 
lists a lack of professional skepticism as a significant contributor to audit failures 
(Beasley et al. 2001; PCAOB 2008).  The PCAOB recently summarized its observations 
gathered from inspection reports issued during the period 2004 through 2007.  In this 
report the PCAOB notes “…in many cases, inadequate supervision and review and 
failures to apply appropriate professional skepticism were important factors that allowed 
deficiencies to occur” (PCAOB 2008, 20).  Also of note, Anderson and Wolfe (2002) list 
a failure to maintain professional skepticism as a contributor to audit malpractice claims. 
 Nelson’s (2009) model of the determinants of professional skepticism in audit 
performance shows that evidential inputs affect skeptical judgments.  Skeptical 
judgments in turn affect skeptical actions, with both judgments and actions affected by an 
auditor’s incentives, traits, knowledge, experience, and training.  Skeptical action affects 
an auditor’s perception and interpretation of the accumulated audit evidence.  The model 
is recursive in that the evidential outcome affects an auditor’s experience, which in turn 
affects evidential inputs.   
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Hurtt (2010) suggests that there are two forms of professional skepticism: trait 
skepticism and state skepticism.  Trait professional skepticism is a person’s innate 
skeptical nature that is constant over time.  State professional skepticism is situational 
and can be increased or decreased depending on an individual’s perception of the 
situation.  Both trait and state skepticism are important in forming an auditor’s skeptical 
mindset, and this mindset leads to skeptical behavior.  Certain moderating variables, such 
as engagement circumstances and client integrity, can affect both state skepticism and 
skeptical behavior.  Hurtt (2010) created a scale to measure trait professional skepticism, 
but at the current time no scale exists to measure state professional skepticism.  Hurtt 
comments: “Our understanding of professional skepticism will remain incomplete…until 
we begin to address the issues of state professional skepticism and skeptical behaviors” 
(2010, 165).  
2.2 Mindset Theory 
 Mindset theory, as described in Gollwitzer (1990), illuminates the interaction 
between cognitive and motivational processes that takes place when individuals make 
decisions and take action.  Of interest to the current study are the two mindsets entered 
into by individuals prior to making a decision: the deliberative mindset and the 
implemental mindset.  These two preactional mindsets are important to the concept of 
professional skepticism because they affect how individuals process and interpret 
information (Gollwitzer 1990; Gollwitzer and Bayer 1999). 
 The first mindset individuals typically enter when making decisions is the 
deliberative mindset (Gollwitzer 1990).  The deliberative mindset can be characterized by 
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impartiality and objectivity.  While in the deliberative mindset, individuals remain 
receptive to information from all sources regardless of the content of that information 
(positive or negative) (Fujita et al. 2007).  Psychology studies show that individuals in a 
deliberative mindset (relative to an implemental mindset) have increased memory 
retention and an increased ability to process information (Heckhausen and Gollwitzer 
1987; Fujita et al. 2007). 
 Individuals will eventually enter an implemental mindset as they become closer to 
making a decision or taking an action.  While in the implemental mindset, individuals 
choose a preferred goal or option and focus on information that will allow them to 
implement that goal (Gollwitzer 1990).  In contrast with the deliberative mindset, the 
implemental mindset can be characterized by partiality and biased information processing 
(Fujita et al. 2007).  Prior studies reveal that individuals in the implemental mindset 
become motivated to finish the task at hand more quickly and place greater value on 
information that supports a chosen goal (Gollwitzer and Kinney 1989; Harmon-Jones and 
Harmon-Jones 2002).  In fact, Taylor and Gollwitzer (1995) show that individuals in the 
implemental mindset consider information that favors a preferred outcome five time more 
frequently than they consider information that disfavors the preferred outcome.   
Given that the concepts of professional skepticism and objectivity are strongly 
linked (Louwers et al. 2011), I propose that professional skepticism would be strongest in 
the deliberative mindset and would be greatly reduced, if not eliminated, in the 
implemental mindset.  This proposition is central to the current study because Gollwitzer 
(1990) claims that individuals can bypass the deliberative mindset and move right into 
the implemental mindset under certain circumstances.  Backof et al. (2011) suggest that 
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one of these circumstances is when a preexisting bias or motivation exists such as an 
auditor’s tendency to side with their client.   
For example, Haynes et al. (1998) note that even experienced auditors have a 
tendency to follow their client’s preferences with regards to inventory write-downs.  
When auditors have directional goals of pleasing their clients, their search for and 
processing of evidence can become biased as greater consideration is placed on evidence 
that favors the client’s position (Lundgren and Prislin 1998; Hackenbrack and Nelson 
1998; Kadous et al. 2003; Montague 2010).  This effect on the search and processing of 
audit evidence is consistent with the effects noted above of being in an implemental 
mindset. 
The tendency to side with a client’s known position could be stronger in a 
complex estimate setting.  For example, consider the audit (evaluation) of a fair value 
estimate.  At times fair value can be easily determined by direct observations of market 
transactions of identical or similar items.  Other times, however, the fair value can only 
be determined with valuation models that require inputs based on assumptions about the 
future (AICPA 2003).  Regarding this latter type of estimation, the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) writes, “Those estimates of fair value are 
inherently imprecise.  That is because, among other things, the estimates may be based on 
assumptions about future conditions, transactions, or events whose outcome is uncertain 
and will therefore be subject to change over time” (AICPA 2003, 2).  I presume that the 
tendency to side with the client would be stronger in this situation because it is harder to 
challenge assumptions than it is to challenge concrete facts, and prior research shows that 
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auditors will react more favorably to clients when ambiguity exists (for examples, see 
Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Ng and Tan 2003). 
 Backof et al. (2011) describe the entry into the implemental mindset as the “point 
of no return” to objectivity.  Thus, mechanisms that can prolong the deliberative mindset 
would be of interest to accounting researchers, practitioners, and regulators because the 
deliberative mindset can potentially help maintain an auditor’s objectivity as he or she 
searches for and reviews evidence during the audit of a complex estimate.  Construal-
level theory ties into mindset theory and illustrates mechanisms that can be used to 
prolong the deliberative mindset. 
2.3 Construal-Level Theory 
Construal-level theory (CLT) offers guidance on how individuals perceive the 
feasibility and desirability of a situation occurring in the near future versus the same 
situation occurring in the distant future.  Although CLT initially focused on temporal 
distance and perceptions, the theory has broadened over the years to include other 
dimensions of distance collectively referred to as psychological distance (Trope and 
Liberman 2003).  Psychological distance “is a subjective experience that something is 
close or far away from the self, here, and now” (Trope and Liberman 2010, 440).  With 
this broader dimension, researchers now use CLT to describe how individuals make 
predictions and evaluate situations, how gambling preferences are affected, and how 
construals can affect interpersonal negotiation (Trope and Liberman 2003; 2010).   
A construal, by definition, is an interpretation.  There are two types of construals 
identified by CLT: low-level construals and high-level construals.  According to Trope 
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and Liberman (2003), low-level construals can be described as complex and detailed 
whereas high-level construals can be described as simple and abstract.  Low-level 
construals focus on the “how” of a situation while high-level construals focus on the 
“why” of a situation.  Low-level construals decrease the psychological distance between 
an individual and what he or she is interpreting (Trope and Liberman 2010). 
 Trope and Liberman (2003) provide an illustration of the difference between the 
two levels of construals.  Consider the act of conducting a research study.  A low-level 
construal of this act is that the researcher is “testing a hypothesis,” or “entering the data 
collected this morning” (p. 405).  In an auditing context, a low-level construal of the act 
of auditing a client’s financial statements would be a listing of any of the specific 
procedures performed during the audit such as interviewing the client, confirming 
accounts receivable, or documenting evidence.  The low-level construals are more 
detailed, transactional interpretations of the act and focus on how to accomplish the act 
(Trope and Liberman 2003; Fujita et al. 2007).  
A high-level construal of the act of conducting a research study is that the 
researcher is “advancing science” (Trope and Liberman 2003, 405).  In an auditing 
context, a high-level construal of the act of auditing is that the auditors are providing 
assurance to financial statement users.  Viewing the act through high-level construals 
makes representations of the event more abstract.  This abstraction allows for easier 
assimilation of information because the representations become less ambiguous, more 
coherent, and more schematic (Trope and Liberman 2010).  High-level construals focus 
on why the act is occurring or will occur and increase the psychological distance between 
an individual and the act (Trope and Liberman 2003; 2010; Fujita et al. 2007).   
22 
 
Prior research links the concepts of construals and psychological distance with 
mindset theory.  Specifically, the deliberative mindset is associated with high-level 
construals and increased psychological distance while the implemental mindset is 
associated with low-level construals and decreased psychological distance (Fujita et al. 
2006; Fujita et al. 2007; Rim et al. 2009).  Given that the deliberative mindset is 
characterized by impartiality and objectivity and that increased psychological distance is 
associated with the deliberative mindset, an extension of CLT theory is that increased 
psychological distance should be associated with increased objectivity.  Correspondingly, 
a decrease in psychological distance should be associated with a decrease in objectivity 
given the link between the implemental mindset (a mindset characterized by the biased 
processing of information), low-level construals, and decreased psychological distance 
(Fujita et al. 2007; Backof et al. 2011). 
Backof et al. (2011) recently applied construal level theory to an auditing setting.  
The authors posit that thinking about an accounting treatment using high-level construals 
will allow auditors to consider the economic substance of the proposed accounting 
treatment rather than getting mired in the specific details of the treatment.  They provide 
evidence that judgment frameworks based on construal-level theory can be effective in 
curbing an auditor’s propensity to accept a client’s aggressive accounting choice when 
the accounting standards are less precise.   
 The Backof et al. (2011) study shows how construal-level theory helps to curb a 
client’s aggressive accounting choices but what remains unclear is how the theory affects 
professional skepticism.  Generalization of the results to professional skepticism is 
difficult for two reasons.  First, participants in the Backof et al. (2011) study provided 
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judgments based on a set of facts rather than on a set of assumptions as would be required 
in the audit of a complex estimate.  In a GAAP setting, the set of facts should lead to a 
relatively clear auditor response that would not require the use of professional 
skepticism.7   
 A related second reason is that an important part of professional skepticism is “the 
gathering and objective evaluation of evidence” (AU 320.07).  The search for audit 
evidence is omitted in the Backof et al. (2011) study.  Objective evaluation of the set of 
facts provided by management in the study is not possible in their study because the 
participants had no method to corroborate or disconfirm the facts provided.   
The current study contributes to the literature beyond the Backof et al. (2011) 
study by employing a setting that is more broadly applicable to professional skepticism, 
because it contains both an evidence search and evaluation process and requires 
judgments based on a set of assumptions rather than a set of facts.  I also contribute to the 
literature by adding tests at the end of the experiment designed to show that participants 
considered the audit evidence with either high-level or low-level construals which will 
help express whether the participants’ mindsets worked as hypothesized.8   
Prior psychology research demonstrates techniques used to create psychological 
distance.  One of these techniques is to have individuals consider a set of objects.  
                                               
7 For example, Backof et al. (2011) use a lease classification case.  Under GAAP, the facts provided clearly 
indicate that the lease should be treated as an operating lease.  Typically, no professional skepticism would 
be called for or used in this scenario.  However, the authors note that the participants’ professional 
skepticism (presumably their state professional skepticism) may have been affected because the lease terms 
appeared to be structured by the client to meet the operating lease classification.  Their wording of the facts 
could have affected professional skepticism unintentionally.  In most lease classification settings the use of 
professional skepticism would not be necessary. 
8 Backof et al. (2011) did not contain such tests nor did they provide sufficient detail for readers to 
determine whether their judgment frameworks worked because of a shift in construals/mindsets. 
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Researchers instruct participants to consider specific examples of items within the set in 
order to decrease psychological distance.  Increased psychological distance is attained by 
having the participants think more broadly and categorically about the set of objects 
(Taylor and Gollwitzer 1995; Fujita et al. 2006; Rim et al. 2009). 
Given the link between psychological distance and mindsets theorized above, 
manipulations that lead to increased psychological distance should help an individual 
maintain a deliberative mindset longer.  Manipulations that decrease psychological 
distance could push an individual into an implemental mindset.  Conversations with both 
current and previous auditors reveal that auditors document specific examples of 
evidence as they work towards completing an audit, a process that could be pushing 
auditors into an implemental mindset early in the audit process.   
2.4 Audit Documentation 
The auditing standards require significant documentation over the course of the 
audit including documentation of “the procedures performed, evidence obtained, and 
conclusions reached with respect to relevant financial statement assertions” (PCAOB 
2004, section 6).  Practitioners and researchers often refer to Auditing Standard No. 3 as 
the “not documented, not done” standard (Piercey 2011).  Audit documentation can start 
early in the course of an audit.   
The current audit documentation process is comparable to manipulations used in 
prior research (as described above) to place participants into an implemental mindset.  
Thus, the process could be inadvertently placing auditors into an implemental mindset 
early in the audit which would be detrimental to the auditor’s professional skepticism.  
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Taylor and Gollwitzer (1995) show that individuals in an implemental mindset perceive 
risk factors as being less likely to affect them than do individuals in a deliberative 
mindset.  A similar finding in an audit context could be detrimental to the audit risk 
assessment process if risk factors are improperly weighed by auditors in an implemental 
mindset (i.e., the risk factors are ignored when they are, in fact, important to consider 
given the situation).   
Piercey (2011) reveals another unintended consequence of the current audit 
documentation process.  He shows that qualitative (as opposed to quantitative) risk 
assessments made as part of the audit documentation requirement can lead to audit 
conclusions more likely to favor the client.  The documentation process could be 
exacerbating the auditor tendency to side with the client described earlier to the extent 
that auditors use their documentation to rationalize their decisions. 
 Payne and Ramsay (2008) reveal that preparing detailed workpapers to satisfy the 
documentation requirements has both positive and negative effects.  On one hand the 
preparation of detailed workpapers improves error identification and pattern recognition.  
On the other hand, detailed workpapers require more time to prepare.  The preparation of 
summary documentation memos (akin to high-level construals of the audit evidence) also 
leads to enhanced pattern recognition and increased memory, both of which should 
increase the rate and efficiency of information/evidence processing.  This result is 
consistent with processing evidence with a deliberative mindset (Heckhausen and 
Gollwitzer 1987; Fujita et al. 2007). 
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 In sum, detailed documentation of audit evidence as required under Auditing 
Standard No. 3 could have the unintended consequence of placing auditors in an 
implemental mindset.  The implemental mindset is associated with biased processing of 
information which would be detrimental to professional skepticism and the audit process 
as a whole.  This study will test whether a method of documentation consistent with the 
concepts of high-level construals, increased psychological distance, and the deliberative 
mindset can help increase professional skepticism. 
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3.0 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Hypothesis 1 
Professional skepticism is marked by objectivity (Louwers et al. 2011).  
Professional skepticism can exist in the deliberative mindset because individuals in this 
mindset have not chosen a goal and process information impartially and objectively 
(Fujita et al. 2007).  However, professional skepticism could be diminished, if not 
eliminated, in the implemental mindset as objectivity is eliminated and individuals focus 
on information that favors their chosen goal. 
 The previous section identifies two forces that can work against professional 
skepticism: the audit documentation process and the tendency for auditors to side with 
their clients.  The current audit documentation process can work against professional 
skepticism because auditors document specific examples of evidence that support their 
overall audit recommendation.  This type of documentation focuses on how the audited 
item is either fairly presented or materially misstated.  Both considering specific 
examples and focusing on the how of a situation (low-level construals) are mechanisms 
used in prior psychology studies to decrease psychological distance (for examples, see 
Taylor and Gollwitzer 1995, Fujita et al. 2006, and Rim et al. 2009).  Low-level 
construals and decreased psychological distance theoretically relate to the implemental 
mindset. 
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 I posit that a change in the way auditors complete audit documentation could be 
effective in prolonging the deliberative mindset which should theoretically increase 
professional skepticism.  The change will involve a switch from considering and 
documenting evidence in terms of low-level construals to considering and documenting 
evidence in terms of high-level construals.  High-level construals help increase 
psychological distance, and both high-level construals and increased psychological 
distance theoretically relate to the deliberative mindset. 
This strategy could prove ineffective, however, if an auditor’s tendency to side 
with his or her client moves the auditor straight into the implemental mindset.  Gollwitzer 
(1990) suggests that the deliberative mindset can be skipped.  Auditors going into an 
audit of a complex estimate with the directional goal of siding with the client could 
already have their objectivity compromised and be in an implemental mindset before the 
audit starts (Backof et al. 2011).  In this case, the question becomes whether the revision 
to the audit documentation process suggested in this paper can move an auditor back into 
a deliberative mindset or whether entry into the implemental mindset truly marks the 
“point of no return” to objectivity suggested by Backof et al. (2011). 
 Thinking in terms of high-level construals involves considering the why of a 
situation rather than the how (Trope and Liberman 2003; 2010).  Further, thinking 
broadly and categorically about a situation rather than considering specific examples also 
marks thinking with high-level construals (Fujita et al. 2006; Trope and Liberman 2010).  
Thus, I predict that having auditors consider broad reasons why a complex estimate is 
either fairly presented or potentially misstated will help auditors remain in a deliberative 
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mindset longer, or push them back into a deliberative mindset from an implemental 
mindset, thus increasing the auditors’ objectivity and professional skepticism. 
H1a:  Auditors receiving documentation instructions designed to 
invoke a deliberative mindset will display higher professional 
skepticism than will auditors receiving documentation instructions 
designed to invoke an implemental mindset. 
H1b:  Auditors receiving documentation instructions designed to 
invoke a deliberative mindset will display higher professional 
skepticism than will auditors not required to document evidence. 
 
3.2 Hypothesis 2  
To help gain further insight into which forces inhibit professional skepticism the 
most, I plan to contrast the professional skepticism displayed by auditors instructed to 
consider and document evidence in terms of low-level construals (akin to current audit 
practice) and auditors not receiving explicit documentation instructions.  There are three 
potential outcomes, all of which I interpret here under the assumption that H1 holds.  The 
first potential outcome is that auditors not receiving explicit documentation instructions 
display lower professional skepticism than will auditors required to consider and 
document evidence with low-level construals.  This outcome would provide some 
evidence that the current audit documentation process actually helps counteract the 
auditor tendency to side with the client. 
The second potential outcome is that there is not a significant difference in 
professional skepticism displayed between auditors considering and documenting 
evidence with low-level construals and auditors not receiving explicit documentation 
instructions.  In this case there would be stronger evidence that the tendency to side with 
the client pushes an auditor into an implemental mindset early.  The audit documentation 
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process would not cause further inhibition to professional skepticism because the move to 
the implemental process had already been completed. 
The third potential outcome is that auditors required to consider and document the 
audit evidence with low-level construals will display lower professional skepticism than 
will auditors not receiving explicit documentation instructions.  In this case the audit 
documentation process could be exacerbating any loss in professional skepticism related 
to the auditor tendency to side with the client.  Alternatively, the audit documentation 
process could be driving the move to the implemental mindset if auditors’ commitment to 
accuracy is greater than their commitment to pleasing the client.9  I consider this last 
potential outcome the most likely given Piercey’s (2011) finding that qualitative audit 
documentation can exacerbate the auditor tendency to side with the client. 
H2:  Auditors receiving documentation instructions designed to 
invoke an implemental mindset will display lower professional 
skepticism than will auditors not required to document evidence. 
 
3.3 Hypothesis 3 
One way the shift between mindsets can be monitored is to examine when 
documentation changes from being broad and abstract (associated with a 
deliberative mindset) to specific and detailed (associated with an implemental 
mindset).  The instructions designed to invoke a deliberative mindset instruct the 
user to think in terms of high-level construals.  High-level construals are 
                                               
9 Backof et al. (2011) provide some evidence that an auditor’s commitment to accuracy is greater than his 
or her commitment to pleasing the client, but at least part of the difference is attributable to the standards 
regime in use.  The commitment to accuracy appears to be much less under a GAAP regime than an IFRS 
regime. 
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characterized as being broad and abstract.  Low-level construals, conversely, are 
characterized as being specific and detailed (Trope and Liberman 2003).  The 
major difference between the two types of responses is that a specific, detailed 
response would mainly appear as a direct copy of an evidence item and would not 
consider the relation of that evidence item with other evidence.  A broad, abstract 
response, on the other hand, would consider an evidence item in general terms 
and would likely consider that item’s relation to other evidence collected.  I 
predict that auditors receiving instructions designed to invoke a deliberative 
mindset will spend more time documenting evidence in a manner consistent with 
high-level construals (i.e., broad and abstract). 
Mindset theory suggests that individuals will inevitably enter the 
implemental mindset as they become closer to making a decision or taking an 
action (Gollwitzer 1990).  Thus, at some point, even individuals receiving 
instructions designed to invoke a deliberative mindset will shift mindsets, 
although there is no ex ante evidence of how and when this shift will occur.  
Regardless, I expect the experimental intervention to prolong the deliberative 
mindset and thus would expect a significantly higher ratio of broad, abstract 
responses to specific, detailed responses among participants in the deliberative 
mindset condition. 
H3a:  Auditors receiving documentation instructions designed to 
invoke a deliberative mindset will have a higher ratio of broad, 
abstract responses to specific, detailed responses than will auditors 
receiving documentation instructions designed to invoke an 
implemental mindset. 
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H3b:  Auditors receiving documentation instructions designed to 
invoke an implemental mindset will have a higher ratio of specific, 
detailed responses to broad, abstract responses than will auditors 
receiving documentation instructions designed to invoke a 
deliberative mindset. 
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4.0 METHOD 
4.1 Introduction  
 I employ an experiment to investigate whether specific mindsets can be invoked 
in auditors and what effect the invoked mindset will have on professional skepticism.  I 
use a computerized experiment that has the experimental manipulations built into it.  The 
use of a computerized instrument allows me to easily investigate elements important to 
the concept of professional skepticism such as the amount of time auditors spend in each 
section of the experiment and how many evidence searches they conduct.  Further, the 
instrument captures textual responses from participants that, as will be discussed further, 
can be coded to allow for insights into the type of mindset displayed by each auditor.  
The unique design of the instrument is useful in determining when auditors shift mindsets 
and what role mindsets play in the auditors’ decision-making processes. 
4.2 Research Design 
 I use a 1 x 3 between-participants experimental design to test my hypotheses.  The 
participants are 58 auditors from local, regional, national, and international accounting 
firms experienced in auditing complex estimates.  The independent variable in this 
experiment is the type of mindset induced.  The first experimental condition attempts to 
induce a deliberative mindset.  The second experimental condition attempts to induce an 
implemental mindset.  The third condition is a condition in which the participants do not 
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receive mindset/documentation instructions.  The participants were randomly assigned to 
one of these three conditions.   
4.3 Treatments/Independent Variable 
 The independent variable in this experiment is the type of mindset induced.  I 
examine each of the two different preactional mindsets: the deliberative mindset and the 
implemental mindset.  The participants in the deliberative mindset condition saw the 
following wording when considering audit evidence: 
Thinking broadly about all of the evidence collectively, list reasons why 
management’s estimate could be fairly presented. 
Thinking broadly about all of the evidence collectively, list reasons why 
management’s estimate could be materially misstated. 
 I draw the wording for this condition from prior construal-level theory literature 
which shows that thinking broadly about a situation and why the situation occurred 
involves using high-level construals which increases the psychological distance between 
a person and the situation and helps maintain a deliberative mindset longer (Fujita et al. 
2004, 2006; Rim et al. 2009; Backof et al. 2011).  The participants view these 
instructions both before and after considering the audit evidence produced by each of 
their searches. 
 The participants in the implemental mindset condition saw the following wording 
when considering audit evidence: 
Thinking specifically about each evidence item, list reasons how management’s 
estimate could be fairly presented. 
Thinking specifically about each evidence item, list reasons how management’s 
estimate could be materially misstated. 
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 I draw the wording for this condition from prior construal-level theory literature 
which shows that thinking about a situation with specific details of the “how” of a 
situation involves using low-level construals which will decrease the psychological 
distance between a person and a situation and will push the person into an implemental 
mindset (Fujita et al. 2004, 2006; Rim et al. 2009; Backof et al. 2011).  The participants 
in the no documentation condition did not receive any instructions regarding the 
evidence. 
4.4 Dependent Variables 
 I capture five dependent variables that can be used to draw inferences about a 
participant’s professional skepticism.  The use of multiple measures of professional 
skepticism should increase the robustness of the results.  The first measure is a 
participant’s assessment of the likelihood that the client’s estimate contains a material 
misstatement.  The second measure is a participant’s assessment of the likelihood that 
they would recommend an adjustment to the client’s estimate.  Answers to both of these 
questions are captured on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 10, with 1 equating to a low 
likelihood and 10 equating to a high likelihood.  Higher likelihoods are representative of 
higher professional skepticism (skeptical judgment) in this task.  I derive both of these 
questions from questions used in Montague (2010). 
 The remaining three dependent variables are captured via participants’ actions in 
the study and are used as measures of skeptical action.  The third dependent variable 
captures the amount of time a participant spends in the search for and review of audit 
evidence phase of the task.  The fourth dependent variable captures the total time a 
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participant spent on the study.  The fifth dependent variable captures the number of 
searches for additional audit evidence conducted by each participant.  I hypothesize that a 
greater number of searches is indicative of higher professional skepticism (skeptical 
action).10   
 During the experiment, participants in the experimental conditions provide textual 
responses relating to their documentation of the audit evidence.  As indicated in section 
4.3, these textual responses come from the audit documentation instructions that are 
specific to the deliberative and implemental mindsets, respectively.  During the final 
judgments phase of the study, all participants provide textual responses to a question 
asking them to support the reasons for their judgments.  I use independent coders to code 
each set of textual responses so that the responses can be analyzed and used to test 
Hypothesis 3.  I describe the coding method in Section 4.7. 
4.5 Covariates 
 I ask the participants several questions on a post-experimental questionnaire.  The 
answers to these questions are examined as possible covariates.  I begin by providing the 
participants with the 30-question Hurtt (2010) professional skepticism scale.  Hurtt 
designed this scale to measure a participant’s trait, or permanent, professional skepticism.  
Each of the questions is answered on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“Strongly 
Disagree”) to 6 (“Strongly Agree”).  The range of possible scores on this scale is 30 to 
180 with higher numbers indicating a higher degree of trait professional skepticism.  In 
                                               
10 The idea that the number of evidence searches is a measure of skeptical action is consistent with the 
description of skeptical action used in Hurtt et al. (2013).  Support for the idea that the time variables can 
be considered measures of skeptical action can be found in Section 5.4. 
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other words, respondents with a high degree of trait professional skepticism are more 
skeptical by nature regardless of the circumstances. 
 Participants also respond to a series of eight questions drawn from Fujita et al. 
(2006) that allow me to measure each participant’s construal level.  The participants are 
asked to choose from one of two descriptions of an event.  One of the descriptions is a 
broad, abstract description consistent with a high-level construal of the event.  The other 
description is a detailed, specific description of the event.  Consistent with Fujita et al. 
(2006), I give participants a score of -1 for each detailed, specific response and +1 for 
each broad, abstract response; thus, the range of possible responses is -8 to +8.  Positive 
total scores are indicative that the participant is in the deliberative mindset while negative 
total scores suggest that the participant is in the implemental mindset. 
 I require participants to answer eleven questions about their thoughts and the 
experimental task.  I provide the scale used to measure the responses to these questions in 
Figure 3.  The first question asks the participants about the confidence they have in their 
assessment of the client’s fair value estimate.  Consistent with a limitation described in 
Montague (2010), auditors lacking confidence in their assessments could be less likely to 
recommend an adjustment to the client’s estimate (thus potentially moderating responses 
to the adjustment likelihood dependent variable). 
 Another question asks the extent to which the participants trust the information 
provided by the client.  Higher trust in the information could result in lower professional 
skepticism displayed by the participants.  I also ask about the perceived riskiness of the 
client.  A higher perceived client riskiness could lead to higher displays of professional 
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skepticism.  Additionally, participants respond with their perceptions of the importance 
of the client.  Auditors may be more likely to accept evidence and estimates provided by 
a client with higher importance and thus would respond with lower professional 
skepticism.  
 I ask seven questions that directly relate to perceptions of the audit task.  The 
answers to these questions can potentially provide further information about the 
participants’ choices and actions.  One of these questions asks the participants about their 
perceived difficulty levels of the task.  My interest here is to see whether the 
experimental interventions increase (or decrease) the perceived difficulty of the task.  I 
also ask about the realism of the task to provide a measure of external validity. 
The other five questions relate to the search for evidence portion of the 
experiment.  First, I ask participants whether they believed the amount of time allocated 
by the audit manager to complete the task was reasonable.  Second, I also ask whether the 
participants felt comfortable taking as many audit hours as necessary to complete the 
task.  Third, I ask the participants whether they were motivated to finish the task in as 
few audit hours as possible.  
 Fourth, I ask whether the participants were satisfied that they evidence they 
collected provided them with a reasonable basis for forming their opinions.  Finally, I 
asked whether the participants would have spent more time on the audit if they had more 
audit hours budgeted to the task.  Each of these five questions can potentially provide 
insights into the reasons why the participants concluded their searches for audit evidence.  
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4.6 Task 
 I use a case adapted from Kohlbeck et al. (2009), as used in Montague (2010), 
which involves an audit of a client’s intangible asset account (reacquired franchise 
rights).  I selected this case for several reasons.  First, the case is based on an actual 
transaction recorded by Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc.  Second, auditors commonly 
perform evaluations of fair value estimates of this type, which helps increase the 
generalizability of the results (Montague 2010).  Third, the case involves a high amount 
of ambiguity which allows for the creation of a setting in which auditors should be 
skeptical. 
 Each participant began the experiment by reviewing background and financial 
information about the client, American Pizza Company (APC).  The information included 
a description of the company and its franchising activities.  A table presented information 
about the client’s financial statements, including the value of its reacquired franchise 
rights accounts.  Participants also read information about the client’s accounting policies 
related to reacquired franchise rights. 
 The next screen of information contained information relevant to the experimental 
task.  Each participant read that their firm has audited APC for over ten years and that the 
client is a significant source of revenue for the firm.  The participants considered specific 
information about the reacquired franchise rights accounts and learned that the fair value 
of the account was greater than the book value of the account.  The current screen also 
displayed management’s assumptions used in generating the fair value estimate.  The 
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participants had the opportunity to review this information as well as the client 
information at any time prior to entering in their final judgments. 
 After reviewing the client and task information, the participants began their search 
for evidence relating to the task.  I created thirty pieces of evidence that related to the 
client and/or the client’s reacquired franchise rights accounts.  In order to create a 
skeptical setting, I generated 12 evidence items which collectively suggested that the 
client’s estimate was overstated.  I also generated six evidence items which collectively 
suggested that the client’s estimate was fairly stated and 12 neutral evidence items which 
were largely irrelevant to the task.  The incorporation of neutral evidence increases the 
external validity of the task since auditors often uncover evidence neither directly 
supports nor disconfirms the client’s position. 
 I gave the list of evidence to several current and former audit managers who 
agreed that each item of evidence was appropriately labeled as either positive, negative or 
neutral evidence.  I also gave an unlabeled, alphabetized list to three audit managers who 
rated the strength of each evidence item on a scale of -5 (Extremely negative) to +5 
(Extremely positive), with 0 labeled as neutral.  The average strength of the negative 
evidence was -2.53 (s.d. = 1.73).  The average strength of the positive evidence was 2.17 
(s.d. = 1.82) while the average strength of the neutral evidence was -0.08 (s.d. = 1.44).  
These ratings by the audit managers provide support for the claimed directionality of the 
evidence as being either positive, negative, or neutral. 
 The first screen of evidence presented to participants contained 10 evidence 
items: four negative items, four neutral items, and two positive items.  Each successive 
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screen of evidence contained five evidence items.  I maintained the same ratio of 2:2:1 
(negative:neutral:positive) in each screen of evidence. 
 In order to reinforce the fact that continued searches for audit evidence are not 
costless, the computerized instrument displayed a time budget to all participants.  The use 
of a time budget in this task is consistent with Montague (2010) and with audit practice.  
On the first screen of evidence, each participant learns that 70-percent of the current audit 
budget has been expended to generate the initial round of evidence.  After learning the 
percent of audit hours used, each participant reads the following statement: 
Your audit manager will look favorably upon you if you complete the fair value 
audit using as few audit hours as possible; however, you should continue 
searching for evidence until you have satisfied yourself that you have obtained 
sufficient appropriate evidential matter to provide you with a reasonable basis for 
forming an opinion. 
 Each successive search for evidence increments the percentage used by 10 
percent.  Each participant had the ability to continue searching up to four times.  
Participants using all available searches go over the budget by 10 percent (i.e., they 
would have used 110 percent of the audit hours allocated to the task by the audit 
manager).  After each search, participants in the deliberative and implemental mindset 
conditions responded to the questions described in section 4.3. 
 Upon completion of their search, the participants reported 1) their perceived risk 
that the estimate is materially misstated; 2) an indication of where in a reasonable range 
the estimate would fall; and 3) their perceived likelihood that they would recommend an 
adjustment to the client’s reacquired franchise rights account.  Each participant also listed 
reasons supported the answers provided.  The participants then completed a post-
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experimental questionnaire that included manipulation checks, the Hurtt (2010) 
professional skepticism scale, and demographic questions. 
 Figure 4 graphically displays the phases of the experiment. 
4.7 Data Coding 
 The participants in the deliberative mindset and implemental mindset conditions 
entered textual responses to the documentation questions described in section 4.3.  The 
majority of the responses consisted of more than one sentence.  I transferred each unique 
set of responses into a cell of a spreadsheet to keep the sentences together. 
Two student assistants blind to my hypotheses served as independent coders.  I 
sorted the responses alphabetically before giving them to the coders.  I instructed the 
coders to consider each cell separately. 
 I told the coders that they needed to code each set of responses into one of two 
possible alternatives.  A set of responses should be coded as -1 if the sentences 
collectively indicated that the respondent appeared to be thinking in specific, detailed 
terms.  Alternatively, a set of responses should be coded as +1 if the sentences 
collectively indicated that the respondent appeared to be thinking in broad, abstract terms. 
 I gave the coders the following example to use in their coding.  I asked them to 
consider that a respondent saw the following items of evidence: 1) The fruit is red; 2) The 
fruit is approximately six inches tall; and 3) The fruit has a stem on top.  An example of 
specific, detailed thinking would be if the respondent simply relisted the evidence 
verbatim and did not draw any conclusions.  On the other hand, and example of broad, 
43 
 
abstract thinking would be if the respondent commented on the evidence but also wrote 
something to the effect of “Considering the evidence collectively leads me to believe that 
this fruit could be an apple.”  In other words, the respondent assimilated the evidence and 
drew a possible conclusion. 
 The coders returned their initial set of coding to me and I noted any differences 
between the codes.  Landis and Koch (1977) suggest that a “moderate” level of 
agreement would be demonstrated with a Cohen’s Kappa coefficient between 0.41 and 
0.60.  The initial inter-rater agreement was low (Cohen’s Kappa coefficient of 0.304).  As 
a result, I performed a recalibration of the instructions with the coders. 
 I next gave the coders a random subset of 100 of the textual responses.  The level 
of agreement for the coding of these responses was much higher than the first attempt 
(Cohen’s Kappa coefficient of 0.616).  According to Landis and Koch (1977), a Kappa 
coefficient between 0.61 and 0.80 would be indicative of “substantial” agreement.  I then 
gave the coders a second subset of 100 items for which the level of agreement was 
moderate (Cohen’s Kappa coefficient of 0.537).  The coders had a high level of 
agreement for the final subset of 93 responses (Cohen’s Kappa coefficient of 0.627).  The 
overall Cohen’s Kappa Coefficient for the full set of responses was 0.580.  The coders 
worked out all remaining differences, so the final version of the coding represents 100 
percent agreement between the two coders. 
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Variable Name Question/Definition 
Independent Variable  
Mindset Condition 
Deliberative mindset condition, Implemental mindset 
condition, or No documentation condition 
Dependent Variables  
Assessment of 
Misstatement Risk 
Given the evidence available in the case, assess the risk that 
management’s fair value estimate of $24,620,000 for the 
reacquired franchise rights in Pennsylvania is materially 
misstated. Likert Scale (1=”Very Unlikely”; 10=”Very 
Likely”) 
Assessment of the 
Likelihood of 
Recommending an 
Adjustment 
Given the evidence available in the case, what is the 
likelihood that you would recommend an adjustment to the 
client’s reported book value for the reacquired franchise 
rights in Pennsylvania (Book Value = $22,770,000). Likert 
Scale (1=”Very Unlikely”; 10=”Very Likely”) 
Time Spent Searching For 
and Reviewing Audit 
Evidence 
The number of minutes spent in the search for, review of, 
and documentation of audit evidence phases of the 
experiment. 
Total Time Spent on the 
Study 
The number of minutes from start of the experiment to the 
conclusion of the experiment 
Number of Searches 
The number of times a participant conducts a search for 
audit evidence beyond the initial round of evidence given to 
them. 
Covariates  
Hurtt (2010) Professional 
Skepticism Score 
Measured using Hurtt’s (2010) professional skepticism scale 
which captures participant trait professional skepticism.  
Measure ranges from 30 – 180, with higher scores 
representing higher inherent professional skepticism. 
Construal Level 
Measured using exercise found in Fujita et al. (2006) which 
captures a participant’s construal level and mindset.  
Measure ranges from -8 to +8, with lower scores 
representing low-level construals (implemental mindset) and 
higher scores representing high-level construals (deliberative 
mindset). 
Confidence in 
Assessment 
How confident do you feel about your assessment of 
management’s fair value estimate for reacquired franchise 
rights in Pennsylvania? Likert Scale (1=”Not Confident”; 
10=”Very Confident”) 
Trust Information 
Provided by Client 
To what extent do you trust the information provided by 
your client? Likert Scale (1=”Do not at all trust”; 
10=”Highly trust”) 
Perceived Riskiness of 
Client 
Please provide your assessment of the riskiness of this client 
based solely on the information available to you in this case. 
Likert Scale (1=”Not Risky at All”; 10=”Very Risky”) 
Client Importance American Pizza Company is an important client for my firm. 
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Likert Scale (1=”Strongly Disagree”; 10=”Strongly Agree”) 
Task Difficulty 
How easy or difficult was this task for you to complete? 
Likert Scale (1=”Very Difficult”; 10=”Very Easy”) 
Reasonableness of Time 
Allocated by Audit 
Manager 
I felt that the time allocated by the audit manager to 
complete this task was reasonable. Likert Scale (1=”Strongly 
Disagree”; 10=”Strongly Agree”) 
Comfort Taking Time 
I felt comfortable taking as many audit hours as necessary to 
complete this task. Likert Scale (1=”Strongly Disagree”; 
10=”Strongly Agree”) 
Motivation to Finish Task 
I was motivated to finish this task in as few audit hours as 
possible. Likert Scale (1=”Strongly Disagree”; 10=”Strongly 
Agree”) 
Satisfied that Evidence 
Collected is Reasonable 
to Form an Opinion 
I am satisfied that the evidence I collected in this task was 
sufficient to have a reasonable basis for forming the opinions 
that I expressed in this study. Likert Scale (1=”Strongly 
Disagree”; 10=”Strongly Agree”) 
Would Have Spent More 
Time if More Audit 
Hours Budgeted 
I would have spent more time on the audit if my audit 
manager had budgeted more time for this task. Likert Scale 
(1=”Strongly Disagree”; 10=”Strongly Agree”) 
Figure 3 – Variable Definitions 
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Figure 4 – Phases of Experiment 
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5.0 RESULTS 
5.1 Analysis of Participant Demographic Information and Responses 
 Fifty-eight experienced auditors from six local, regional, national, and 
international public accounting firms participated in my study.  Table 5.1 displays the 
demographic information both between experimental conditions and combined.  The 
participants averaged 29.6 years of age with both gender types represented equally.  The 
participants reported an average of 8.3 years of general work experience and 5.4 years of 
audit experience.  Most of the participants reported being at the audit senior level (60.3 
percent of the sample) and that they work for an international accounting firm (74.1 
percent of the sample).  Each participant completed the Hurtt professional skepticism 
questionnaire which measures a person’s trait, or permanent, skepticism level.  
Participants averaged a score of 129.71 based on their responses.  Skepticism scores did 
not significantly vary between experimental conditions (p-value of 0.204). 
I required that participants have at least some experience auditing fair value 
estimates in order to take part in this study.  However, six participants (10.3-percent of 
the sample) reported having no such experience.  I checked for differences in the 
responses of these six participants and found that the participants reporting no fair value 
auditing experience reported a significantly lower number of evidence searches than 
participants with fair value auditing experience (means of 1.0 and 2.31 searches, 
respectively).  The responses to the other dependent variables did not differ between 
48 
 
groups.  The results discussed in this chapter do not differ if these participants are 
removed from the sample. 
Each participant completed a post-experimental questionnaire that contained 
several questions.  All of the questions were answered on ten-point scales numbered from 
one to 10.  Table 5.2 provides information about participant responses to these questions.  
Overall the participants expressed confidence in their assessments of the client’s fair 
value estimate (?̅? = 7.40 on a scale where 1 = “Not Confident” and 10 = “Very 
Confident”).  The participants agreed that the client is an important client to the firm (?̅? = 
8.95 on a scale where 1 = “Strongly Disagree” and 10 = “Strongly Agree”).  The 
participants further agreed that the experimental task is a realistic example of an audit 
task (?̅? = 7.59 on a scale where 1 = “Strongly Disagree” and 10 = “Strongly Agree”).   
The participants disagreed about other aspects of the experimental task.  
Participants in the deliberative mindset condition rated the task as significantly more 
difficult (?̅? = 5.95 on a scale where 1 = “Very Difficult” and 10 = “Very Easy) than did 
participants in the implemental mindset condition (?̅? = 7.21) and the no documentation 
condition (?̅? = 7.40), with a p-value for the difference of 0.049.  A possible reason for 
this difference is that participants in the deliberative mindset condition had to consider 
the evidence collectively rather than singularly which could have been more cognitively 
taxing. 
The participants also disagreed about the appropriateness of the time allocated to 
the task.  I first asked participants whether they felt that the time allocated by the audit 
manager to complete the task was reasonable.  Participants in the deliberative mindset 
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condition indicated that they felt that the time allocated to the task by the audit manager 
was significantly less reasonable (?̅? = 5.05 on a scale where 1 = “Strongly Disagree” and 
10 = “Strongly Agree”) than did participants in the implemental mindset condition (?̅? = 
7.37) and the no documentation condition (?̅? = 6.70), with a p-value for the difference of 
0.008. 
I also asked participants if they would have spent more time on the audit if the 
audit manager had budgeted more time for the task.  Participants in the deliberative 
mindset condition indicated significantly higher agreement with this question (?̅? = 6.84 
on a scale where 1 = “Strongly Disagree” and 10 = “Strongly Agree”) than did 
participants in the implemental mindset condition (?̅? = 4.63) and the no documentation 
condition (?̅? = 4.95), with a p-value for the difference of 0.017.  The probable reason for 
these differences can be demonstrated by observing the number of evidence searches 
conducted between conditions.  Participants in the deliberative mindset condition 
executed the maximum number of evidence searches nine times while participants in the 
other two conditions executed the maximum number of searches only four times each.  In 
contrast, participants in the implemental mindset condition finished the task after the first 
evidence search eight times while participants in the deliberative mindset and no 
documentation conditions finished after the first search only three times combined.  
Figure 5 graphically displays a breakdown of the number of additional searches by 
experimental condition. 
Although each of these variables that differs between conditions will be analyzed 
as potential covariates, there are two additional variables that have a sound theoretical 
basis for covarying with the dependent variables.  First, I asked participants the extent 
50 
 
that they trusted the information provided by the client.  On a scale of 1 to 10 (1 = “Do 
Not Trust at All” and 10 = “Highly Trust”), participants in the deliberative mindset 
condition claimed that they trusted the client’s information less (?̅? = 4.16) than did 
participants in the implemental mindset condition (?̅? = 7.11) and the no documentation 
condition (?̅? = 6.25), with a p-value for the difference of 0.000.  This finding is consistent 
with the ex ante notion that trust would be lower in someone who is more skeptical.   
Second, I asked participants to rate the overall riskiness of the client using a ten-
point scale where 1 is set to “Not Risky at All” and 10 is set to “Very Risky.”  
Participants in the implemental mindset condition reported the lowest assessments of risk 
(?̅? = 4.05).  The participants in the deliberative mindset condition reported the highest 
assessments of risk (?̅? = 7.74).  The p-value for the difference in conditions is 0.000.  
This difference is consistent with Taylor and Gollwitzer’s (1995) finding that individuals 
in a deliberative mindset better attend to risk factors. 
5.2 Tests for Differences in Testing Location 
I collected responses from the auditors in person whenever possible.  However, 28 
participants (48.3-percent of the participants) completed the study on their own time due 
to firm requests or logistical problems.11  I test for differences in demographic variables, 
dependent variables, and potential covariates between these two groups.  These 
differences are displayed in Table 5.3.  I find that there are significant differences 
between the groups in two of the demographic variables: the type of firm for which they 
are employed and the number of years of general work experience.   
                                               
11 For example, I attempted to conduct the study in person at one firm but found that the firm’s internet 
security suite blocked participant access to my study’s website.  These participants had to complete the 
study on their own time and on their own computers. 
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The first difference is not surprising because I conducted the study onsite with all 
the smaller accounting firms (local, regional, and national firms) represented in my 
sample and only some of the largest accounting firms (international firms).  In contrast, 
all 28 participants who completed the study on their own represented large, international 
accounting firms.  The difference in general work experience is likely attributable to 
outliers in this variable.  Of the 14 participants noting that they had greater than 10 years 
of general work experience, only three completed the study on their own time.  Further, 
two participants that completed the study onsite reported general work experience of 25 
and 30 years, respectively. 
 I include testing location as a control variable in my supplemental analyses.  The 
results do not differ when this variable is included in any of the tests discussed below. 
5.3 Discussion of the Efficacy of the Experimental Manipulations 
 A key aspect of this paper is that there is a relation between high-level construals, 
the deliberative mindset, and increased psychological distance and professional 
skepticism.  Further, there should be a relation between low-level construals, the 
implemental mindset, and decreased psychological distance and professional skepticism.  
I use procedures and instructions from prior construal-level theory literature that have 
been designed to push an individual into a specific mindset. 
 I draw the wording for the deliberative mindset condition from prior construal-
level theory literature which shows that thinking broadly about a situation and why the 
situation occurred involves using high-level construals which increases the psychological 
distance between a person and the situation and helps maintain a deliberative mindset 
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longer (Fujita et al. 2004, 2006; Rim et al. 2009; Backof et al. 2011).  The participants in 
the deliberative mindset condition saw the following wording when considering audit 
evidence: 
Thinking broadly about all of the evidence collectively, list reasons why 
management’s estimate could be fairly presented. 
Thinking broadly about all of the evidence collectively, list reasons why 
management’s estimate could be materially misstated. 
The participants then entered their thoughts and reasons into separate textboxes for each 
question. 
 I draw the wording for the implemental mindset condition from prior construal-
level theory literature which shows that thinking about a situation with specific details of 
the “how” of a situation involves using low-level construals which will decrease the 
psychological distance between a person and a situation and will push the person into an 
implemental mindset (Fujita et al. 2004, 2006; Rim et al. 2009; Backof et al. 2011).  The 
participants in the implemental mindset condition saw the following wording when 
considering audit evidence: 
Thinking specifically about each evidence item, list reasons how management’s 
estimate could be fairly presented. 
Thinking specifically about each evidence item, list reasons how management’s 
estimate could be materially misstated. 
The participants then entered their thoughts and reasons into separate textboxes for each 
question. 
 In order to test the efficacy of these manipulations, participants completed an 
exercise derived from Fujita, Trope, Liberman, and Levin-Sagi (2006) that helps capture 
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the participant’s mindset.12  The participants considered eight situations and chose a 
description of the situation from one of two choices.  One choice contained a high-level 
interpretation (construal) of the situation while the other contained a low-level 
interpretation (construal) of the situation.  Consistent with Fujita et al. (2006), I scored 
each response as -1 if the participant chose the low-level interpretation and +1 if the 
participant chose the high-level interpretation.  The scores could thus range from a 
minimum of -8 to a maximum of +8 with negative scores indicating an implemental 
mindset and positive scores indicating a deliberative mindset. 
 Table 5.4 shows the breakdown of construal level by experimental condition.  
Participants in the deliberative mindset condition had, on average, high, positive scores 
(?̅? = 6.11) which implies success with the deliberative mindset manipulation.  I find 
further evidence of the manipulation’s success in an examination of the minimum and 
maximum scores for participants in this condition.  The minimum score of any participant 
in the deliberative mindset condition was zero which suggests that no participant in this 
condition chose more low-level responses than high-level responses.   
Participants in the implemental mindset condition had, on average, moderately 
negative scores (?̅? = -2.42) which is evidence of the success of the implemental mindset 
manipulation.  Participants in the no documentation condition averaged slightly positive 
scores (?̅? = 1.40) indicating that they might have been on boundary of the two mindsets.  
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicates that the difference in scores between 
conditions is significant (p-value = 0.000).  Planned contrasts reveal that the construal 
                                               
12 The Fujita et al. (2006) exercise has been used as a measure of mindset in a number of studies, including 
Meyvis et al. (2012), Alter et al. (2010), and Schmeichel and Vohs (2009). 
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scores are significantly higher in the deliberative mindset condition than in both the 
implemental mindset condition (p-value = 0.000) and the no documentation condition (p-
value = 0.000).13  The contrasts also show that the construal scores are significantly lower 
in the implemental mindset condition than in the no documentation condition (p-value = 
0.008).  Collectively, I take these results as indicators of the success of the experimental 
manipulations. 
5.4 Descriptive Statistics Regarding Dependent Variables and Potential Covariates 
   The study contains several dependent variables that can be used to make 
inferences about auditors’ professional skepticism and how the level of skepticism affects 
auditor judgment.  I use five primary measures of professional skepticism.  Consistent 
with Montague (2010), two of these measures, assessments of the risk that the client’s 
estimate is materially misstated and assessments of the likelihood that the participant 
would recommend an adjustment of the client’s estimate, can be considered measures of 
skeptical judgment.  Following the definition of skeptical action used by Hurtt et al. 
(2013), I measure skeptical action through the number of times participants searched for 
additional audit evidence.  I posit that the time spent searching for and reviewing 
evidence and the total time spent on the study are also viable measures of skeptical 
action.  Table 5.5 displays univariate statistics for each of these measures. 
The first dependent variable is the participants’ assessments of the risk that the 
client’s estimate is materially misstated.  The participants entered their responses on a 
scale of 1 to 10 where 1 signified “Very Unlikely” and 10 signified “Very Likely.”  As 
                                               
13 The results of a Levene’s test reveal that the variances between these variables are not homogeneous.  
Therefore, I use the results of the planned contrasts that do not assume equal variances.  All p-values are 
halved because the contrasts are one-tailed. 
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shown in Table 5.5, participants in the deliberative mindset believed the risk to be higher 
(?̅? = 7.53) than did their counterparts in the implemental mindset (?̅? = 4.00) and no 
documentation (?̅? = 4.25) conditions, respectively. 
The second dependent variable is the participants’ assessments of the likelihood 
that they would recommend an adjustment to the client’s estimate.  The participants 
entered their responses on a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 signified “Very Unlikely” and 10 
signified “Very Likely.”  Participants in the deliberative mindset condition indicated the 
highest likelihood of recommending an adjustment (?̅? = 6.74).  The participants in the 
implemental mindset condition indicated the lowest likelihood of recommending an 
adjustment (?̅? = 3.16). 
 The third dependent variable is the time spent on the search for and review of 
audit evidence portion of the task.  As shown in Table 5.5, participants in the deliberative 
mindset condition spent the most time searching for evidence with an average of 16.6 
minutes per participant.  Participants in the implemental mindset condition spent the 
second most time searching for evidence with an average of 11.2 minutes per participant.  
Participants in the no documentation condition spent the least amount of time searching 
for evidence, with an average of 5.1 minutes per participant.  
On the surface it may seem strange that participants in the no documentation 
condition spent the least amount of time searching (?̅? = 5.1 minutes per participant) even 
though they conducted about the same number of searches as participants in the 
deliberative mindset condition.  This apparent oddity is easily explained by returning to 
the description of the experimental task.  Participants in the no documentation condition 
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did not have to enter their thoughts and/or reasons for why the client’s estimate could be 
fairly presented or materially misstated.  Not having the documentation requirement 
likely resulted in faster searches for and reviews of evidence. 
The fourth dependent variable is the total time spent on the entire study.  Once 
again, participants in the deliberative mindset condition spent the most time out of all the 
conditions with an average of 26.7 minutes per participant.  Participants in the 
implemental mindset condition averaged 19.1 minutes per participant while participants 
in the no documentation condition spent the least amount of time on the study (?̅? = 17.6 
minutes per participant) likely due to the reasons described above.  The data show, 
however, that the difference in time spent between participants in the implemental 
mindset condition and participants in the no documentation condition decreased with this 
measure.  One possible reason is that participants in the no documentation condition had 
to spend more time formulating their thoughts after the search portion of the task while 
participants in the other conditions had been formulating their thoughts during the search 
portion of the task.  I find evidence for this reason in the fact that participants in the no 
documentation condition spent almost three minutes more, on average, responding to the 
dependent variable questions than did participants in the implemental mindset condition, 
a difference that is statistically significant (p-value of 0.000, untabulated). 
The final dependent variable is the number of searches for audit evidence 
conducted by each participant.  As discussed in Section 5.1, participants in the 
deliberative mindset, on average, conducted the greatest number of evidence searches (?̅? 
= 2.63).  Participants in the no documentation condition conducted slightly less searches 
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on average (?̅? = 2.50), while participants in the implemental mindset condition conducted 
the fewest number of searches (?̅? = 1.37). 
Table 5.6 shows the correlations between the dependent variables.  Not 
surprisingly, participant responses for the risk that the client’s estimate is materially 
misstated and responses for the likelihood of recommending an adjustment to the client’s 
estimate are highly correlated (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.844).  Likewise, the 
time spent searching for audit evidence and the total time spent on the study are highly 
correlated (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.926).  The high correlations between the 
dependent variables suggest that a multivariate approach such as MANOVA should be 
considered for testing the hypotheses.  Also, the high correlations between the number of 
searches variable and both the search time variable (Pearson correlation coefficient = 
0.554) and the total time variable (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.612) support my 
claim that the time variables can be considered measures of skeptical action.14   
I next examine the correlations between the dependent variables and potential 
covariates (described in Section 5.1).  Table 5.7 displays these correlations.  A few 
covariates are highly correlated with the dependent variables, including trust in the 
information provided by the client, the belief that the time allocated by the audit manager 
was reasonable, and perceptions of the client’s riskiness. 
In order to be considered as a possible covariate in an analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA), the potential covariate should be highly correlated with the dependent 
                                               
14 A factor analysis provides further support for this claim.  The search time, total time, and number of 
searches variables all load onto the same factor, with loadings of 0.948, 0.965, and 0.754, respectively.  The 
assessment of misstatement risk and the likelihood of an adjustment variables load onto a second factor, 
with loadings of 0.946 and 0.967, respectively. 
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variable(s) but not correlated with the independent variable(s) because this correlation 
would be a violation of the assumption of homogeneity of regression (Huitema 2011).  
Table 5.7 shows that the three covariates mentioned above are significantly correlated 
with the independent variable.  Thus, I will not include these variables in the subsequent 
analysis.15   
I also test for possible effects of including demographic variables in the analysis.  
I first examine the correlations between the dependent variables and the demographic 
variables.  None of the demographic variables are significantly correlated with the 
measures of skeptical judgment (risk of material misstatement in the estimate and the 
likelihood of recommending an adjustment). 
I do note significant correlations between some of the demographic variables and 
the measures of skeptical action.  I find that the number of additional searches for audit 
evidence variable is significantly correlated with the number of months of work 
experience (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.307), a dummy variable that equals one if 
the participant has experience auditing fair values (Pearson correlation coefficient = 
0.268), the type of firm which employs the participant (Pearson correlation coefficient = -
0.271), and the participant’s position (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.276).  The time 
spent searching for and processing audit evidence dependent variable is significantly 
correlated with the number of months of work experience ((Pearson correlation 
coefficient = 0.280) and the type of firm which employs the participant (Pearson 
correlation coefficient = -0.339). The total time spent on the experiment dependent 
                                               
15 I also examined interactions between the covariates and the independent variable.  The interactions are 
significant which further suggests that the inclusion of these covariates in an ANCOVA model would 
violate the homogeneity of regression assumption. 
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variable is significantly associated with gender (Pearson correlation coefficient = -0.270) 
suggesting that females spent less time), the number of months of work experience 
(Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.372), the number of months of audit experience 
(Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.318) and the type of firm which employs the 
participant (Pearson correlation coefficient = -0.410).16  The inclusion of these variables, 
either separately or collectively, does not significantly affect the results described below 
or the inferences drawn from those results. 
5.5 Assumption Testing 
 5.5.1 Assumptions for Hypotheses 1 and 2 
I consider the use of multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) for 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 because of the high correlations between the dependent variables 
noted in the previous section.  I plan to combine the two time variables (time spent 
searching for and reviewing audit evidence and total time spent on the study) and the 
misstatement risk and likelihood of recommending an adjustment variables, respectively, 
given the high correlations between the variables within each pair.17  MANOVA 
effectively combines two or more dependent variables and creates a composite mean 
based on the variables.  These composite means, also known as mean vectors or 
centroids, are then compared with one another in an analysis similar to a univariate 
ANOVA (Sheskin 2004) 
                                               
16 The variable which captures the type of firm which employs the participant is coded zero for local 
accounting firms, one for regional accounting firms, two for national accounting firms, and three for 
international accounting firms.  Interestingly, these correlations suggest that larger accounting firms are 
associated with lower skeptical actions 
17 I do not include the number of searches variable with the time variables because, as will be discussed in 
Section 5.6.1, there are problems interpreting the time variables between the mindset conditions and the no 
documentation condition.  The inclusion of the number of searches variable in the MANOVA analysis 
using the time variables does not change the inferences drawn from the results. 
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 MANOVA is superior to ANOVA when two or more dependent variables are 
highly correlated for several reasons.  First, MANOVA avoids the inflated Type I error 
rate that can result from employing multiple tests of the dependent variables separately.  
Second, MANOVA takes the correlations into account when computing the MANOVA 
test statistic.  Third, MANOVA has more power to detect a significant effect based on the 
composite mean than does ANOVA in detecting effects of the singular dependent 
variables (Sheskin 2004; Stevens 1996). 
 MANOVA has five assumptions that should be met.  First, the dependent 
variables should be normally distributed.  Second, the variances and covariances of the 
dependent variables should be homogeneous (homogeneity of the variance-covariance 
matrices).  Third, the observations must be independent.  Fourth, there should be linear 
relationships between all pairs of dependent variables and potential covariates.  Finally, 
cell sizes should be approximately equal (Finch 2005; Stevens 1996).   
 One of the assumptions of multivariate analysis is that the data are normally 
distributed.  I test for normality using two statistical tests: Kolmogorov-Smirnov (with 
Lilliefors significance correction) and Shapiro-Wilk.  Nonsignificant results from these 
tests suggest that the data are normally distributed.  Table 5.8 displays these results which 
suggest that all five of my dependent variables are not normally distributed.  Recent 
studies suggest, however, that ANOVA and, by extension, MANOVA are robust to 
violations of the normal distribution assumption and can outperform nonparametric 
versions of ANOVA when only this assumption is violated and the non-normality is 
caused by skewness rather than by outliers (Schmider et al. 2010; Finch 2005; Stevens 
1996).    
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 I begin searching for possible outliers by examining histograms and boxplots of 
the data.  Neither the boxplots nor the histograms for the number of evidence searches, 
misstatement risk, or adjustment likelihood variables indicate potential outliers.  My 
visual interpretation is confirmed by examining Cook’s D scores and leverage scores as 
well as by applying the outlier labeling rule described in Hoaglin et al. (1986). 
 Visual analysis of the histograms for time spent during the search phase of the 
study and for the total time spent on the study reveals that the data are heavily skewed to 
the left and that there could be one outlier.  Neither of the boxplots suggests that this 
observation could be an outlier and an examination of Cook’s D scores and leverage 
scores confirms this suggestion.  I also apply the outlier labeling rule because the data are 
not normally distributed (Hoaglin et al. 1986).  Applying this rule does not suggest that 
there is an influential outlier in the data.  I conclude that the use of MANOVA is still 
appropriate provided that none of the other assumptions are violated. 
I employ two tests of the homogeneity of the dependent variables’ variance-
covariance matrices: Box’s test of equality of covariance matrices and Levene’s test of 
equality of error variances.  Box’s test produces a statistic based on the combination of 
the correlated dependent variables while Levene’s test produces a statistic based on the 
individual dependent variables. 
Panel A of Table 5.9 shows the results of the Box’s tests for the pairings of the 
time variables and the risk/likelihood variables.  Both results suggest that the null 
hypothesis of equal observed covariance matrices of the dependent variables across 
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conditions should be rejected.  Thus, it appears that the homogeneity of the variance-
covariance matrices will also be violated. 
The impact of this violation is minimal in MANOVA when cell sizes are 
approximately equal (Stevens 1996).  However, additional evidence of this violation can 
be found in Panel B of Table 5.9.  The Levene’s tests suggest that there could be equal 
error variances in the risk of material misstatement and likelihood of recommending an 
adjustment dependent variables; however, the statistical significance of the time variables 
reveals that the error variances are not likely to be equal across conditions in those 
variables. 
MANOVA assumes that each of the observations is independent (Finch 2005).  I 
achieve independence by randomly assigning participants to the experimental conditions.  
MANOVA also assumes that there is a linear relation between the proposed pairings of 
the dependent variables.  I confirm the linearity of both sets of proposed dependent 
variables couplings (the time variables and the risk/likelihood variables) through visual 
analysis of scatterplots.  Further evidence of linearity is provided in the high correlations 
between these variables noted in section 5.4.  Finally, my cell sizes are approximately 
equal (19, 19, and 20). 
In conclusion, the data violate two of the MANOVA assumptions: the assumption 
of normality and the assumption of homogeneity of the variance-covariance matrices.  
Finch (2005) shows that nonparametric MANOVA outperforms parametric MANOVA 
when both the normality and the homogeneity assumptions are not met.  Specifically, 
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nonparametric MANOVA has a lower Type I error rate and higher power than its 
parametric equivalent.   
Following this finding, I conclude that nonparametric MANOVA is the 
appropriate statistical method for analyzing the dependent variables that are highly 
correlated.  The Kruskal-Wallis test is a nonparametric test used for ANOVA that can 
also be used for MANOVA (Finch 2005).  I will run planned contrasts to test for specific 
differences between experimental conditions.  I will use a median test and individual 
ANOVAs (parametric and nonparametric) to test the robustness of the nonparametric 
MANOVA.  Finally, I will include any covariate that has a correlation of greater than 
|0.400| in supplemental analyses.   
As discussed earlier, I consider the number of searches for audit evidence variable 
in a separate analysis because of possible interpretation difficulties that may arise from 
comingling the time variables with this variable.  In order to further test Hypotheses 1 
and 2, I plan to use a one-way ANOVA using the number of searches variable.  The 
assumptions of ANOVA are largely the same as the assumptions for MANOVA. 
As shown previously in Table 5.8, the data in the number of searches dependent 
variable are not normally distributed; however, ANOVA is robust to violations of the 
normality assumptions (Finch 2005; Stevens 1996).  Panel B of Table 5.9 shows a 
nonsignificant value for the Levene’s test which indicates that I should fail to reject the 
null hypothesis that the error variances are equal across conditions in this variable.  
Finally, I achieve independence of the observations by randomly assigning participants to 
the experimental conditions.  I conclude that a one-way ANOVA is the appropriate 
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statistical test for this variable and will supplement this test with planned contrasts 
between experimental conditions. 
5.5.2. Assumptions for Hypothesis 3 
I examine the coding of the textual responses entered by the participants in my 
analysis of Hypothesis 3.  Recall that the independent coders assigned a value of +1 if a 
set of responses indicated broad, abstract thinking (consistent with the deliberative 
mindset and high-level construals.  The coders assigned a value of -1 if a set of responses 
indicated specific, detailed thinking (indicative of the implemental mindset and low-level 
construals). 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b predict a greater likelihood of one type of response over 
another between experimental conditions.  Hypothesis 4a predicts that participants in the 
deliberative mindset condition will be more likely to enter broad, abstract responses than 
will participants in the implemental mindset condition.  Similarly, Hypothesis 4b predicts 
that participants in the implemental mindset condition will be more likely to enter 
specific, detailed responses than will participants in the deliberative mindset condition.18 
Given that I collect multiple responses from each participant over time and that 
the coding is bivariate, the appropriate statistical test would appear to be repeated 
measures logistic regression.  Each participant had the option of continuing the search for 
evidence up to four times, however, which lead to a nonuniform number of responses 
                                               
18 Note that I do not include the no documentation participants in this analysis.  Participants in the no 
documentation condition only entered one set of textual responses after concluding their search and 
responding to the initial dependent variable questions.  Mindset theory would suggest that individuals at 
this stage of the decision process will have already entered the implemental mindset.  Thus, the responses 
entered here cannot be directly compared with responses entered in the predecisional  portion of the task.  I 
reveal the types of responses given by these participants in a later section but do not include these 
responses in the statistical analysis. 
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between participants.  The number of responses range from one (indicating a participant 
that did not conduct any additional searches) to five (indicating a participant that 
conducted the maximum number of searches).  As previously shown in Table 5.5, 
participants varied greatly in the number of searches they conducted.  The nonuniform 
number of repeated measures precludes the use of repeated measures logistic regression. 
I next examine the raw number of responses of each type entered by participants 
in each condition.  Panel A of Table 5.10 reveals the number of (percentage of) responses 
of each type entered by participants collectively in each condition.19  Note that the total 
number of responses is different between the experimental conditions.  As a result, I 
cannot test for differences using the raw numbers. 
I convert the raw numbers into proportions (percentages).  The conversion of the 
raw numbers into proportions helps standardize the data to make analysis between the 
two conditions easier.  These proportions, displayed in Panel B of Table 5.10, are the 
proportions (standard deviations) of each type of response by participant calculated by 
taking the number of each type of response (broad and abstract or detailed and specific) 
entered by each participant and dividing that number by the total number of responses 
entered by each participant.  In other words, if a participant entered three responses coded 
as +1, -1, and +1, respectively, that participant would be said to have a broad, abstract 
proportion of 66.7 percent and a detailed, specific proportion of 33.3 percent.   
A paired t-test is inappropriate for this analysis because the proportion dependent 
variable is not strictly continuous.  Further, normality tests indicate that the data in the 
                                               
19 As noted in footnote 13, I include the responses of participants in the no documentation condition for 
informational purposes only.  These responses are not included in the statistical analysis of Hypothesis 3. 
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implemental mindset condition are not normally distributed.  I thus consider a 
nonparametric form of the t-test, the Mann-Whitney test. 
The assumptions of the Mann-Whitney test are twofold: that the two samples are 
random and independent and that the dependent variable is intrinsically continuous 
(Sheskin 2004).  The first assumption is satisfied through my experimental design in 
which participants are randomly placed into conditions.  The second assumption is 
satisfied with the use of a proportion dependent variable in which one can determine 
whether one observation’s value is greater than another (Sheskin 2004).  I conclude that 
the Mann-Whitney test is the appropriate statistical test of Hypothesis 3. 
There are two experimental conditions tested (deliberative mindset condition and 
implemental mindset condition).  The proportion variable shows the proportion of one 
type of response over a second type of response.  Given these two facts, the Mann-
Whitney test will test both hypotheses simultaneously because testing for differences in 
the proportion of broad, abstract responses between conditions is the same as testing for 
differences in the proportion of detailed, specific responses between conditions.20 
 
 
 
                                               
20 For example, consider the case where participants in the deliberative mindset condition averaged 60-
percent broad, abstract responses while participants in the implemental mindset condition averaged 30-
percent broad, abstract responses.  By extension, participants in the deliberative mindset condition would 
average 40-percent detailed, specific responses while participants in the implemental mindset condition 
would average 70-percent detailed, specific responses.  Testing for differences between 60-percent and 30-
percent is the same statistically as testing for differences between 40-percent and 70-percent when the cell 
sizes are equal. 
67 
 
5.6 Tests of Hypotheses 
 5.6.1 Tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 
 Hypothesis 1 collectively predicts that auditors receiving instructions designed to 
invoke a deliberative mindset will display higher professional skepticism than will 
auditors receiving documentation instructions designed to invoke an implemental mindset 
or auditors not required to document evidence.  Hypothesis 2 predicts that auditors 
receiving instructions designed to invoke a deliberative mindset will display lower 
professional skepticism than will auditors not required to document evidence.  Recall that 
I use multiple measures of professional skepticism: assessments of the risk of material 
misstatement in the client’s estimate, assessments of the likelihood that the auditor would 
recommend an adjustment of the estimate, the time spent searching for and reviewing 
audit evidence, the total time spent on the study, and the number of searches for 
additional audit evidence.  The first two variables are measures of skeptical judgment 
while the remaining three variables measure skeptical action.   
 I first analyze the skeptical judgment variables using a Kruskal-Wallis test.  Panel 
A of Table 5.11 reveals the mean ranks assigned to each variable by experimental 
condition.  Panel B displays the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test for differences in these 
mean ranks.  Both the risk of misstatement and the likelihood of recommending an 
adjustment variables are significantly different between conditions with p-values of 0.000 
and 0.001, respectively. 21    
                                               
21 Recall that although the Box’s Test suggested that the judgment dependent variables failed the 
homogeneity assumption, the Levene’s tests of the individual variables suggested that the variables meet 
the homogeneity assumption.  Finch (2005) shows that parametric MANOVA outperforms nonparametric 
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I test the robustness of these results with a median test.  The results of the median 
test can be found in Panel C of Table 5.11.  Both of the dependent variables are 
statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.001 for the risk of misstatement variable and a 
p-value of 0.030 for the likelihood of recommending an adjustment variable. 
Additionally, I run the dependent variables through a one-way ANOVA (non-tabulated) 
and find that each of the dependent variables is statistically significant with a p-value of 
0.000 in each case. 
These tests reveal that there are differences in the judgment dependent variables 
between conditions but do not reveal where these differences can be found.  I therefore 
use planned contrasts to provide additional information that can be used to address 
Hypotheses 1 and 2.  Panel A of Table 5.12 displays the results of planned contrasts of 
the risk of misstatement variable.  
The first contrast tests that the assessed risk of misstatement in the deliberative 
mindset condition is higher than the assessed risk of misstatement in the implemental 
mindset condition.  The significant p-value of 0.000 reveals that the difference in 
assessed risk is significantly different between these two conditions, with assessments in 
the deliberative mindset being significantly higher.  This result provides support for 
Hypothesis 1a. 
The second contrast tests that the assessed risk of misstatement in the deliberative 
mindset condition is higher than the assessed risk of misstatement in the no 
                                                                                                                                            
MANOVA when the normality assumption is not met but the data meet the homogeneity assumption.  I 
therefore use parametric MANOVA for these two variables to confirm the results.  The results (non-
tabulated) of the MANOVA are consistent with the results of the nonparametric MANOVA, with a F-
statistic (Pillai’s Trace) of 6.378 and a p-value of 0.000. 
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documentation condition.  I find that auditors in the deliberative mindset condition 
assessed a significantly higher risk than did auditors in the no documentation condition 
(p-value of 0.000).  This result provides support for Hypothesis 1b.  The collective results 
of these two planned contrasts provide significant support for Hypothesis 1. 
The third contrast tests that the assessed risk of misstatement in the implemental 
mindset condition is lower than the assessed risk of misstatement in the no 
documentation condition.  The difference between the assessments in these two 
conditions is only 0.25.  The nonsignificant results are not surprising, then, as I fail to 
find support for Hypothesis 2 with this dependent variables (p-value of 0.364). 
I repeat the analyses above using the two time dependent variables: time spent 
searching for and reviewing audit evidence and total time spent on the study.  I begin by 
running a Kruskal-Wallis test using these two variables.  Panel A of Table 5.13 displays 
the mean ranks of the two dependent variables by experimental condition.  Panel B 
reveals that the mean ranks are significantly different between conditions, with a p-value 
of 0.000 for the time spent searching for audit evidence variable and a p-value of 0.002 
for the total time spent on the study variable. 
I again test the robustness of these results with a median test.  The results of the 
median test can be found in Panel C of Table 5.13.  Both of the dependent variables are 
statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.000 for the time spent searching for evidence 
variable and a p-value of 0.001 for the total time spent on the study variable. 
Additionally, I run the dependent variables through a one-way ANOVA (non-tabulated) 
and find that each of the dependent variables is statistically significant with a p-value of 
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0.000 for the time spent searching for evidence variable and a p-value of 0.008 for the 
total time spent on the study variable. 
I use planned contrasts to identify the differences in these variables.  Panel A of 
Table 5.14 reveals the results for the time spent searching for audit evidence variable.  
The first contrast tests that the auditors in the deliberative mindset condition spent more 
time searching for and reviewing audit evidence than did the auditors in the implemental 
mindset conditions.  The difference of 5.49 minutes is statistically significant with a p-
value of 0.043.  This result provides additional support for Hypothesis 1a. 
Support for Hypothesis 1b can be found in the second contrast which tests for 
differences in time spent between auditors in the deliberative mindset condition and 
auditors in the no documentation condition.  This contrast reveals a statistically 
significant difference in time spent of 11.50 (p-value of 0.000); however, this result 
should be interpreted with caution.  Recall that auditors in the no documentation 
condition did not have to document the audit evidence they uncovered.  This difference 
between experimental conditions could be driving the significant result.   
The third contrast tests for differences in time spent searching for and reviewing 
audit evidence between auditors in the implemental mindset condition and auditors in the 
no documentation condition.  The difference of 6.01 minutes is statistically significant (p-
value of 0.022).  Again, this result should be interpreted with caution. 
I next examine planned contrasts using the total time spent on the study variable.  
The results of these contrasts can be found in Panel B of Table 5.14.  I find further 
support for Hypothesis 1a in the results of the first contrast.  This contrasts tests for a 
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significant difference in total time spent on the study between auditors in the deliberative 
mindset condition and auditors in the implemental mindset condition.  The difference of 
7.59 minutes is statistically significant (p-value of 0.017).  
Likewise, the second planned contrast reveals a significant difference.  Auditors 
in the deliberative mindset condition spent an average of 9.09 more minutes on the study 
than did participants in the no documentation condition.  This difference is significant (p-
value of 0.000) and supports Hypothesis 1b, but the difference can again be attributable 
to differences in the experimental conditions.  Overall, the results of these two contrasts 
combined with the results of the first two contrasts of the judgment variables and the first 
time variable provide collective strong support for Hypothesis 1. The final planned 
contrast of these variables is a test for the difference in time spent between auditors in the 
implemental mindset condition and auditors in the no documentation condition.  The 
difference of 1.51 minutes is not statistically significant (p-value of 0.330).   
 I conclude my tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 by examining the number of additional 
searches for audit evidence conducted by participants between experimental conditions.   
Recall that each auditor could conduct up to four more searches beyond the initial search 
for audit evidence.  I test for differences in the number of searches conducted between 
conditions using a one-way ANOVA.   
 Panel A of Table 5.15 shows the results of the ANOVA.  There is a significant 
difference between the mean number of searches conducted in the three experimental 
conditions (p-value of 0.014).  I test for the specific differences using planned contrasts. 
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 The results of the planned contrasts can be found in Panel B of Table 5.15.  The 
first contrast reveals that auditors in the deliberative mindset condition conducted 1.26 
more searches, on average, than did their counterparts in the implemental mindset 
condition.  This difference is statistically significant (p-value of 0.004) and provides 
further support for Hypothesis 1a. 
 The second contrast shows that auditors in the deliberative mindset condition 
conducted only 0.13 more searches, on average, than auditors in the no documentation 
condition.  This result is not significant (p-value of 0.386) and provides no additional 
support for Hypothesis 1b.  This lack of a finding is curious considering that auditors in 
the deliberative mindset condition displayed higher professional skepticism than auditors 
in the no documentation condition with the measures of professional skepticism 
discussed earlier. 
 One possible reason why auditors in these two conditions do not differ in their 
number of searches could be a difference in their perceptions of the task difficulty.  As 
previously shown in Table 5.2, auditors in the deliberative mindset condition perceived 
the task as significantly more difficult than auditors in the other two conditions.  
However, Table 5.7 shows a nonsignificant correlation between experimental condition 
and task difficulty. 
 In order to more definitively test my conjecture, I test for this correlation again 
using only participants from the deliberative mindset and no documentation conditions.  
This time I find a negative correlation between experimental condition and task difficulty 
just short of conventional significance (p-value = 0.055).  The change from almost no 
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relation to a moderately significant relation provides fuel for future research into the 
possible relation between task difficulty and professional skepticism.   
The final contrast shows that auditors in the implemental mindset condition 
conducted 1.13 fewer searches for evidence than did auditors in the no documentation 
condition. This result provides support for Hypothesis 2 and exhibits further evidence 
that the implemental mindset could be inhibiting professional skepticism. 
5.6.2 Tests of Hypothesis 3 
 Hypothesis 3a predicts that auditors receiving documentation instructions 
designed to invoke a deliberative mindset will be more likely to enter broad, abstract 
responses to the documentation questions than will auditors receiving instructions 
designed to invoke an implemental mindset.  Hypothesis 3b predicts that auditors 
receiving documentation instructions designed to invoke an implemental mindset will be 
more likely to enter specific, detailed responses to the documentation questions than will 
auditors receiving instructions designed to invoke a deliberative mindset.   
 In terms of raw numbers, participants in the deliberative mindset condition 
responded with a larger percentage of broad, abstract responses.  As shown in Table 5.10, 
deliberative mindset participants responded with a broad, abstract response 62.2 percent 
of the time.  In contrast, implemental mindset participants responded with broad, abstract 
responses only 34.16 percent of the time.  Participants in the deliberative mindset 
condition responded with detailed, specific responses 37.8 percent of the time as 
compared with 65.84 percent of the time by implemental mindset participants. 
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I test both of the hypotheses simultaneously using a Mann-Whitney test.22  Panel 
A of Table 5.16 shows the mean ranks for both experimental conditions.  The results of 
the Mann-Whitney test shown in Panel B suggest that there is a significant difference 
between the proportion of broad, abstract responses delivered by the auditors in the 
deliberative mindset condition and auditors in the implemental mindset condition.  By 
extension, there must also be a significant difference between the proportion of detailed, 
specific responses by auditors in the respective conditions.  Hypothesis 3 is supported.23 
  
                                               
22 Recall from section 5.5.3 that both hypotheses are tested simultaneously because the dependent variable 
is a proportion between two possible outcomes. 
23 I confirm these results by using a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test.  Further, because the main 
reason why I could not use repeated measure logistic regression is the fact that the number of repeated 
measures is different between participants, I also use a generalized estimating equation which allows for 
missing data.  I continue to find support for Hypothesis 3. 
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Figure 5 – Number of Additional Evidence Searches by Condition 
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TABLE 5.1. Participant Demographic Statistics  
 
 
Deliberative 
Mindset 
Condition 
Mean (s.d. or 
percent of 
sample) 
(n = 19) 
Implemental 
Mindset 
Condition 
Mean (s.d. or 
percent of 
sample) 
(n = 19) 
 
No 
documentation 
Condition 
Mean (s.d. or 
percent of 
sample) 
(n = 20) 
 
 
Total 
Mean 
(s.d. or 
percent 
of 
sample) 
(n = 58) 
 
 
 
 
 
p-value 
      
Gender      0.529 
  Male 10 (52.6%) 11 (57.9%) 8 (40.0%) 
29 
(50.0%) 
 
  Female 9 (47.4%) 8 (42.1%) 12 (60.0%) 
29 
(50.0%) 
 
Age 
28.05 
(4.034) 
29.89 
(4.267) 
30.70 
(5.823) 
29.57 
(4.842) 
0.221 
General 
work 
experience 
(years) 
7.11 
(5.322) 
8.42 
(6.086) 
9.35 
(6.930) 
8.31 
(6.125) 
 0.526 
Audit work 
experience 
(years) 
4.63 
(3.095) 
5.26 
(4.107) 
6.25 
(5.077) 
5.40 
(4.171) 
 0.481 
Experience 
auditing fair 
value 
estimates 
16 
(84%) 
17 
(89%) 
19 
(95%) 
52 
(90%) 
 0.556 
Hurtt 
professional 
skepticism 
score 
131.74 
(16.251) 
124.05 
(16.092) 
133.15 
(17.942) 
129.71 
(16.990) 
 0.204 
Auditor rank     0.496 
  Staff 3 (15.8%) 2 (10.5%) 3 (15.0%) 
8 
(13.8%) 
 
  Senior 13 (68.4%) 12 (63.2%) 10 (50.0%) 
35 
(60.3%) 
 
  Manager 3 (15.8%) 4 (21.1%) 6 (30.0%) 
13 
(22.4%) 
 
  Partner 0 (0.0%) 1 (5.2%) 1 (5.0%) 2 (3.5%)  
Firm Type     0.923 
  Local 1 (5.3%) 1 (5.3%) 2 (10.0%) 4 (6.9%)  
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Table 5.1 (Continued) 
  Regional 3 (15.8%) 3 (15.8%) 2 (10.0%) 
8 
(13.8%) 
 
  National 0 (0.0%) 1 (5.3%) 2 (10.0%) 3 (5.2%)  
International 15 (78.9%) 14 (73.7%) 14 (70.0%) 
43 
(74.1%) 
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TABLE 5.2. Participant Responses to Post-Experimental Questionnaire 
 
 
 
Deliberative 
Mindset 
Condition 
Mean (s.d.) 
(n = 19) 
 
Implemental 
Mindset 
Condition 
Mean (s.d.) 
(n = 19) 
 
 
No 
documentation 
Condition 
Mean (s.d.) 
(n = 20) 
 
 
Total 
Mean (s.d. 
or percent 
of sample) 
(n = 58) 
 
 
 
 
 
p-
value 
      
Confidence in 
assessment 
6.84 
(2.192) 
7.58 
(1.644) 
7.75 
(1.118) 
7.40 
(1.716) 
0.204 
Trust 
information 
provided by 
client 
4.16 
(1.740) 
7.11 
(2.233) 
6.25 
(1.372) 
5.84 
(2.167) 
0.000 
Time allocated 
by manager 
reasonable 
5.05 
(2.223) 
7.37 
(2.650) 
6.70 
(1.922) 
6.38 
(2.441) 
0.008 
Difficulty of 
task (lower = 
harder) 
5.95 
(2.013) 
7.21 
(2.417) 
7.40 
(1.789) 
6.86 
(2.013) 
0.049 
Comfort taking 
as many audit 
hours as 
necessary 
6.00 
(2.809) 
7.05 
(1.840) 
7.40 
(1.789) 
6.83 
(2.233) 
0.127 
Client 
importance 
8.89 
(1.595) 
9.00 
(1.374) 
8.95 
(1.050) 
8.95 
(1.330) 
0.972 
Motivation to 
finish task in as 
few audit hours 
as possible 
5.63 
(1.921) 
5.95 
(2.656) 
4.95 
(2.800) 
5.50 
(2.487) 
0.447 
Task realism 
8.32 
(1.797) 
7.26 
(2.941) 
7.20 
(2.238) 
7.59 
(2.384) 
0.270 
Client riskiness 
7.74 
(1.939) 
4.05 
(2.248) 
5.60 
(1.231) 
5.79 
(2.360) 
0.000 
Satisfied that 
evidence 
gathered was 
sufficient to 
form opinion 
6.95 
(2.068) 
7.26 
(2.806) 
7.15 
(2.110) 
7.12 
(2.310) 
0.916 
Would have 
spent more 
time on task if 
more hours 
budgeted 
6.84 
(3.023) 
4.63 
(2.033) 
4.95 
(2.305) 
5.47 
(2.631) 
0.017 
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TABLE 5.3 Tests for Differences in Testing Location 
 
At Firm  
Mean (s.d. or 
percent of sample) 
(n = 30) 
On Own Time 
Mean (s.d. or 
percent of sample) 
(n = 28) 
p-value 
    
Gender    1.000 
  Male 15 (50.0%) 14 (50.0%)  
  Female 15 (50.0%) 14 (50.0%)  
Age 
30.17 
(4.893) 
28.93 
(4.791) 
0.335 
General work 
experience (years) 
10.07 
(7.187) 
6.43 
(4.077) 
0.022 
Audit work 
experience (years) 
6.23 
(4.847) 
4.50 
(3.145) 
0.115 
Experience auditing 
fair value estimates 
26 (86.7%) 26 (92.9%) 0.448 
Hurtt professional 
skepticism score 
133.37 
(15.690) 
125.79 
(17.725) 
0.090 
Auditor rank   0.381 
  Staff 4 (13.3%) 4 (14.3%)  
  Senior 16 (53.3%) 19 (67.9%)  
  Manager 9 (30.0%) 4 (14.3%)  
  Partner 1 (3.3%) 1 (3.6%)  
Firm Type   0.000 
  Local 4 (13.3%) 0 (0.0%)  
  Regional 8 (26.7%) 0 (0.0%)  
  National 3 (10.0%) 0 (0.0%)  
  International 15 (50.0%) 28 (100.0%)  
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TABLE 5.4. Participant Construal Levels 
Panel A: Participant Construal Level by Experimental Condition 
 
 
 
Deliberative 
Mindset 
Condition 
Mean (s.d.) 
(n = 19) 
 
 
Implemental 
Mindset 
Condition 
Mean (s.d.) 
(n = 19) 
 
 
No 
documentation 
Condition 
Mean (s.d.) 
(n = 20) 
 
 
 
 
Total 
Mean 
(s.d.) 
(n = 58) 
 
 
 
 
 
p-
value 
      
Construal 
level (min -8; 
max +8) 
6.11 
(2.536) 
-2.42 
(5.480) 
1.40 
(3.560) 
1.69 
(5.282) 
0.000 
 
Panel B: Planned Contrasts 
Contrast* Difference 
Std. 
Error 
t-statistic df 
p-value 
(one-
tailed) 
Deliberative 
Mindset > 
Implemental 
Mindset 
8.53 1.385 6.154 25.372 0.000 
Deliberative 
Mindset > No 
documentation 
4.71 0.986 4.772 34.370 0.000 
Implemental 
Mindset < No 
documentation 
3.82 1.488 2.568 30.657 0.008 
* I use weights of +1, -1 for the first two contrasts, respectively, and -1, +1 for the 
third contrast. 
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TABLE 5.5. Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables 
 
 
Deliberative 
Mindset 
Condition 
Mean (s.d.) 
(n = 19) 
 
Implemental 
Mindset 
Condition 
Mean (s.d.) 
(n = 19) 
 
 
No 
documentation 
Condition 
Mean (s.d.) 
(n = 20) 
 
 
Total 
Mean (s.d. 
or percent 
of sample) 
(n = 58) 
     
Risk of material 
misstatement 
7.53 
(2.245) 
4.00 
(2.380) 
4.25 
(2.074) 
5.24 
(2.723) 
Likelihood of 
recommending an 
adjustment 
6.74 
(2.997) 
3.16 
(2.522) 
4.00 
(2.103) 
4.62 
(2.943) 
Time spent searching 
for and reviewing 
audit evidence (in 
minutes) 
16.65 
(6.371) 
11.15 
(11.778) 
5.14 
(2.973) 
10.88 
(9.067) 
Total time spent on 
the study (in minutes) 
26.68 
(6.407) 
19.09 
(13.312) 
17.59 
(6.470) 
21.06 
(9.946) 
Number of searches 
2.63 
(1.535) 
1.37 
(1.571) 
2.50 
(1.100) 
2.17 
(1.500) 
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Table 5.6. Correlations Between Dependent Variables* 
 
Risk of 
material 
misstatement 
Likelihood of 
recommending 
an adjustment 
Time 
spent 
searching 
for and 
reviewing 
audit 
evidence 
Total time 
spent on 
the study 
Number of 
searches 
Risk of material 
misstatement 
1 
0.844 
(0.000) 
0.509 
(0.000) 
0.454 
(0.000) 
0.453 
(0.000) 
Likelihood of 
recommending 
an adjustment 
0.815 
(0.000) 
1 
0.304 
(0.020) 
0.286 
(0.029) 
0.393 
(0.002) 
Time spent 
searching for 
and reviewing 
audit evidence 
0.567 
(0.000) 
0.439 
(0.001) 
1 
0.926 
(0.000) 
0.610 
(0.000) 
Total time spent 
on the study 
0.477 
(0.000) 
0.381 
(0.003) 
0.888 
(0.000) 
1 
0.549 
(0.000) 
Number of 
searches 
0.442 
(0.001) 
0.433 
(0.001) 
0.554 
(0.000) 
0.612 
(0.000) 
1 
* - The figures above the diagonal are Pearson correlation coefficients (p-values).  The 
figures below the diagonal are Spearman’s rho coefficients (p-values). 
Boldfaced values are significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 5.7. Correlations Between Dependent Variables, Independent Variable and Possible Covariates* 
 
Confidence 
in 
assessment 
Trust 
information 
provided by 
client 
Time 
allocated by 
manager 
reasonable 
Difficulty 
of task 
Comfort 
taking as 
many audit 
hours as 
necessary 
Client 
importance 
Motivation 
to finish 
task in as 
few audit 
hours as 
possible 
Task 
realism 
Client 
riskiness 
Satisfied 
that 
evidence 
gathered 
was 
sufficient to 
form 
opinion 
Would have 
spent more 
time on task 
if more 
hours 
budgeted 
Hurtt 
professional 
skepticism 
score 
Risk of 
material 
misstate-
ment 
-0.186 
-0.213 
-0.588 
-0.516 
-0.423 
-0.398 
-0.272 
-0.268 
-0.250 
-0.126 
-0.147 
-0.120 
-0.142 
-0.178 
-0.025 
-0.050 
0.701 
0.621 
-0.339 
-0.345 
0.342 
0.270 
-0.114 
-0.057 
Likelihood 
of 
recommen-
ding an 
adjustment 
-0.154 
-0.250 
-0.593 
-0.587 
-0.402 
-0.437 
-0.273 
-0.316 
-0.379 
-0.308 
-0.157 
-0.208 
-0.029 
-0.105 
0.020 
-0.064 
0.746 
0.727 
-0.215 
-0.333 
0.334 
0.280 
-0.115 
-0.033 
Time 
spent 
searching 
for and 
reviewing 
audit 
evidence 
-0.105 
-0.189 
-0.409 
-0.523 
-0.287 
-0.381 
-0.241 
-0.335 
-0.058 
-0.093 
-0.030 
-0.052 
-0.315 
-0.352 
-0.141 
-0.141 
0.436 
0.587 
-0.313 
-0.382 
0.301 
0.220 
0.139 
0.192 
Total time 
spent on 
the study 
-0.129 
-0.155 
-0.457 
-0.525 
-0.402 
-0.456 
-0.255 
-0.300 
-0.082 
0.010 
-0.039 
-0.107 
-0.438 
-0.459 
-0.249 
-0.284 
0.516 
0.583 
-0.350 
-0.437 
0.248 
0.217 
0.308 
0.396 
Number of 
searches 
0.062 
-0.069 
-0.386 
-0.352 
-0.243 
-0.233 
-0.027 
-0.046 
-0.070 
-0.015 
-0.092 
-0.106 
-0.334 
-0.329 
-0.137 
-0.145 
0.501 
0.423 
-0.360 
-0.376 
0.250 
0.222 
0.193 
0.206 
Mindset 
Condition 
(IV) 
0.218 
0.159 
0.393 
0.422 
0.275 
0.269 
0.297 
0.271 
0.258 
0.218 
0.017 
-0.083 
-0.115 
-0.093 
-0.192 
-0.201 
-0.367 
-0.387 
0.036 
0.035 
-0.294 
-0.265 
0.038 
0.027 
* - The figures displayed are Pearson correlation coefficients (Spearman’s rho coefficients).  Boldface indicates that the correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 5.8. Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df p-value Statistic df p-value 
Risk of 
material 
misstatement 
0.140 58 0.007 0.933 58 0.003 
Likelihood of 
recommending 
an adjustment 
0.193 58 0.000 0.902 58 0.000 
Time spent 
searching for 
and reviewing 
audit evidence 
0.209 58 0.000 0.851 58 0.000 
Total time 
spent on the 
study 
0.123 58 0.029 0.942 58 0.008 
Number of 
searches 
0.182 58 0.000 0.865 58 0.000 
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Table 5.9. Tests of the Homogeneity of the Variance-Covariance Matrices 
Panel A: Box’s Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices 
 Box’s M F-statistic df 1 df 2 p-value 
Risk/likelihood 
dependent 
variables 
23.565 3.721 6 74181.049 0.001 
Time 
dependent 
variables 
48.169 7.605 6 74181.049 0.000 
      
Panel B: Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances 
 F-statistic df 1 df 2 p-value 
Risk of material 
misstatement 
0.530 2 55 0.591 
Likelihood of recommending 
an adjustment 
1.336 2 55 0.271 
Time spent searching for and 
reviewing audit evidence 
16.788 2 55 0.000 
Total time spent on the study 10.273 2 55 0.000 
Number of searches 2.813 2 55 0.069 
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Table 5.10. Breakdown of Textual Responses  
Panel A: Breakdown by Experimental Condition 
 Deliberative 
mindset condition 
Implemental 
mindset condition 
No documentation 
condition 
Number of 
(Percent of) 
broad, 
abstract 
responses 
92 
(63.0%) 
44 
(40.7%) 
12 
(60.0%) 
Number of 
(Percent of) 
detailed, 
specific 
responses 
54 
(37.0%) 
64 
(59.3%) 
8 
(40.0%) 
Total number 
of responses 
146 108 20 
 
Panel B: Breakdown by Participant 
Average 
percentage 
(std. dev.) of 
broad, 
abstract 
responses (by 
participant) 
0.6220 or 62.20% 
(0.258) 
0.3416 or 34.16% 
(0.284) 
0.6000 or 60.00% 
(0.503) 
Average 
percentage 
(std. dev.) of 
detailed, 
specific 
responses (by 
participant) 
0.3780 or 37.80% 
(0.258) 
0.6584 or 65.84% 
(0.284) 
0.4000 or 40.00% 
(0.503) 
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Table 5.11. Tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 – Judgment Dependent Variables 
Panel A: Mean Ranks from Kruskal-Wallis Test 
 Mean rank (risk of 
misstatement) 
Mean rank (likelihood of 
recommending an adjustment) 
Deliberative 
mindset condition 
43.34 41.00 
Implemental 
mindset condition 
21.82 20.34 
No documentation 
condition 
23.65 27.28 
 
Panel B: Results of Kruskal-Wallis Test 
   Chi-square df p-value 
Risk of misstatement 19.438 2 0.000 
Likelihood of recommending an adjustment 15.053 2 0.001 
 
Panel C: Results of a Median Test 
 N Median Chi-square df p-value 
Risk of 
misstatement 
58 6.00 14.482 2 0.001 
Likelihood of 
recommending an 
adjustment 
58 4.50 7.042 2 0.030 
   
88 
 
Table 5.12. Planned Contrasts of Judgment Dependent Variables 
Panel A: Planned Contrasts of Risk of Misstatement 
Contrast* Difference Std. Error t-statistic df 
p-value 
(one-tailed) 
Deliberative 
Mindset > 
Implemental 
Mindset 
3.53 0.725 4.865 55 0.000 
Deliberative 
Mindset > No 
documentation 
3.28 0.716 4.578 55 0.000 
Implemental 
Mindset < No 
documentation 
0.25 0.716 0.349 55 0.364 
      
Panel B: Planned Contrasts of Likelihood of Recommending an Adjustment 
Contrast* Difference Std. Error t-statistic df 
p-value 
(one-tailed) 
Deliberative 
Mindset > 
Implemental 
Mindset 
3.58 0.830 4.310 55 0.000 
Deliberative 
Mindset > No 
documentation 
2.74 0.820 3.338 55 0.001 
Implemental 
Mindset < No 
documentation 
0.84 0.820 1.027 55 0.155 
* I use weights of +1, -1 for the first two contrasts, respectively, and -1, +1 for the third 
contrast. 
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Table 5.13. Tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 – Time Dependent Variables 
Panel A: Mean Ranks from Kruskal-Wallis Test 
 Mean rank (time spent 
searching for and 
reviewing audit evidence) 
 
Mean rank (total time spent on the 
study) 
Deliberative 
mindset condition 
43.47 40.68 
Implemental 
mindset condition 
26.84 23.26 
No documentation 
condition 
18.75 24.80 
      
Panel B: Results of Kruskal-Wallis Test 
   Chi-square df p-value 
Time spent searching for and reviewing audit 
evidence 
21.587 2 0.000 
Total time spent on the study 12.476 2 0.002 
      
Panel C: Results of a Median Test 
 N Median Chi-square df p-value 
Time spent 
searching for and 
reviewing audit 
evidence 
58 7.00 28.779 2 0.000 
Total time spent 
on the study 
58 18.83 13.274 2 0.001 
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Table 5.14. Planned Contrasts of Time Dependent Variables 
Panel A: Planned Contrasts of Time Spent Searching For and Reviewing Audit Evidence 
Contrast* Difference Std. Error t-statistic df 
p-value 
(one-tailed) 
Deliberative 
Mindset > 
Implemental 
Mindset 
5.49 3.072 1.787 27.703 0.043 
Deliberative 
Mindset > No 
documentation 
11.50 1.606 7.164 25.196 0.000 
Implemental 
Mindset < No 
documentation 
** 
-6.01 2.783 -2.161 20.175 0.022 
      
Panel B: Planned Contrasts of Total Time Spent on the Study 
Contrast* Difference Std. Error t-statistic df 
p-value 
(one-tailed) 
Deliberative 
Mindset > 
Implemental 
Mindset 
7.59 3.389 2.238 25.914 0.017 
Deliberative 
Mindset > No 
documentation 
9.09 2.062 4.408 36.932 0.000 
Implemental 
Mindset < No 
documentation 
-1.51 3.379 -0.445 25.757 0.330 
* I use weights of +1, -1 for the first two contrasts, respectively, and -1, +1 for the third 
contrast. I use the contrast results that do not assume equal variances. 
** The significant difference found in this contrast shows the implemental mindset group 
is significantly different from the no documentation group, but in the opposite direction 
of the prediction. 
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Table 5.15. Tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 – Number of Searches For Evidence 
Dependent Variable 
Panel A: Results of a One-Way ANOVA 
 Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F-statistic p-value 
Between 
Groups 
18.434 2 9.217 4.615 0.014 
Within 
Groups 
109.842 55 1.997   
Total 128.276 57    
      
Panel B: Planned Contrasts 
Contrast* Difference Std. Error t-statistic df 
p-value 
(one-tailed) 
Deliberative 
Mindset > 
Implemental 
Mindset 
1.26 0.459 2.755 55 0.004 
Deliberative 
Mindset > No 
documentation 
0.13 0.453 0.291 55 0.386 
Implemental 
Mindset < No 
documentation 
1.13 0.453 2.499 55 0.008 
* I use weights of +1, -1 for the first two contrasts, respectively, and -1, +1 for the third 
contrast. 
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Table 5.16. Tests of Hypothesis 3 
Panel A: Mean Ranks from Mann-Whitney Test Using Proportion of Broad, 
Abstract Responses 
 Mean rank (Percentage of 
broad, abstract responses by 
participant) 
Sum of 
ranks 
Deliberative mindset condition 24.42 464.00 
Implemental mindset condition 14.58 277.00 
Panel B: Results of Mann-Whitney Test Using Proportion of Broad, Abstract 
Responses 
 Mann-
Whitney 
U 
Wilcoxon W 
z-
statistic 
p-value 
Percentage of broad, 
abstract responses by 
participant 
87.000 277.000 -2.741 0.006 
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6.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Summary of Key Findings 
This study tests for a relation between psychological distance, mindsets, and 
professional skepticism.  Regulators have criticized auditors for displaying a lack of 
professional skepticism (PCAOB 2008; Bratten et al. 2013); accordingly, a goal of this 
study is to test an intervention designed to prolong the deliberative mindset, a mindset 
which can be theoretically and positively linked to higher professional skepticism.  I 
employ 1 x 3 between-participants design to test my hypotheses and use experienced 
auditors as participants.  I incorporate multiple measure of professional skepticism in my 
tests.  Table 6.1 contains a summary of each hypothesis and its results. 
 Hypothesis 1a predicts that auditors receiving instructions designed to invoke a 
deliberative mindset will display higher professional skepticism than will auditors 
receiving documentation instructions designed to invoke an implemental mindset.  
Similarly, Hypothesis 1b predicts that auditors receiving the deliberative mindset 
instructions will display higher professional skepticism than will auditors not required to 
document evidence.  I use five measures of professional skepticism to test these 
hypotheses.  The first two, the assessed risk that management’s estimate contains a 
material misstatement and the likelihood that the auditor would recommend an 
adjustment to the estimate, can be considered measures of skeptical judgment (Montague 
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2010).  The amount of time spent searching for and reviewing evidence, the total time 
spent on the study, and the number of searches for audit evidence are measures of 
skeptical action (Hurtt et al. 2013). 
 I find significant support for both Hypothesis 1a and 1b usingall five of my 
measures of professional skepticism..  Auditors receiving the instructions designed to 
invoke a deliberative mindset assessed a higher risk that the estimate is materially 
misstated than did auditors receiving instructions designed to invoke an implemental 
mindset and auditors not required to document evidence.  Auditors in the deliberative 
mindset condition also responded that they would be more likely to recommend an 
adjustment of the estimate.   
Further, auditors in the deliberative mindset condition spent more time searching 
for and reviewing audit evidence, spent more time on the study, and conducted more 
searches for evidence than did auditors in the implemental mindset condition.  I find 
some support for Hypothesis 1b in that auditors in the deliberative mindset, when 
compared with auditors in the no documentation condition, spent significantly more time 
searching for and reviewing audit evidence and spent more time on the study.24  
However, these two groups did not differ on the number of times they searched for more 
audit evidence.   
A possible reason why I did not find support for Hypothesis 1b using the number 
of searches variable is that participants in the deliberative mindset condition found the 
task to be significantly more difficult than participants in the other two conditions.  
                                               
24 As discussed earlier, the differences in these variables could be attributable to differences in the 
experimental conditions, particularly for the time spent searching for and reviewing audit evidence 
variable. 
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Participants in the no documentation group could have searched for more evidence 
because they neither felt this difficulty taxation nor did they have to document the 
evidence they found.  Thus, it would have been less costly in terms of cognitive load for 
participants in the no documentation condition to continue searching. 
 Hypothesis 2 predicts that auditors receiving documentation instructions designed 
to invoke an implemental mindset will display lower professional skepticism than will 
auditors not required to document evidence.  I find mixed support for this hypothesis.  
Participants between these two conditions did not significantly differ in their assessments 
of the risk of misstatement or their assessed likelihoods of recommending an adjustment.  
Thus, I find no support using the measures of skeptical judgment. 
 I find no statistical difference between the total time spent on the study between 
participants in the implemental mindset group and participants in the no documentation 
group.  Participants in the no documentation group spent significantly less time searching 
for and reviewing audit evidence, but this contrary result can be explained by the fact that 
these participants did not have to document the evidence.  Therefore, they could have 
spent less time on this phase of the task due to differences in the requirements rather than 
because they displayed lower professional skepticism.   
I find that participants in the implemental mindset condition conducted 
significantly fewer searches for evidence than did participants in the no documentation 
condition.  This finding strengthens the inference that the implemental mindset is 
associated with lower professional skepticism and provides support for Hypothesis 2.  
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Auditors in an implemental mindset could be more susceptible to biases such as the 
preference to side with the client.   
 Hypothesis 3a predicts that auditors receiving instructions designed to invoke a 
deliberative mindset will be more likely to enter broad, abstract documentation responses 
than will auditors receiving instructions designed to invoke an implemental mindset.  In 
turn, Hypothesis 3b predicts that auditors in the implemental mindset group will be more 
likely to enter detailed, specific documentation responses than will their counterparts in 
the deliberative mindset group.  I find strong support for this set of hypotheses. 
6.2 Contributions 
 This study offers a number of important contributions to research, practice, and 
regulation.  First, I contribute to auditing and psychology theory by demonstrating the 
relation between psychological distance, mindsets, and professional skepticism.  In 
particular, I show that the deliberative mindset, previously related to increased 
psychological distance, is positively related to higher professional skepticism.  In 
contrast, I document a negative relation between the implemental mindset (decreased 
psychological distance) and lower professional skepticism. 
 I provide information important to academics, practitioners, and regulators 
interested in creating a judgment framework to assist with the audits of complex 
estimates (as described in SEC 2008 and Bratten et al (2013)).  My results suggest that 
having an auditor consider the “why” of a situation rather than the “how” of a situation 
can boost professional skepticism.  Such a simple intervention can easily be incorporated 
into any judgment framework. 
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Additionally relevant to the judgment framework and consistent with prior 
psychology research, I demonstrate a relation between mindsets and the type of responses 
used to document or describe the situation.  Establishing this link helps solidify the 
relation between mindsets, psychological distance and professional skepticism described 
throughout the paper.  Specifically, broad, abstract responses are associated with 
increased psychological distance (Trope and Liberman 2003; 2010; Fujita et al. 2007), 
and I demonstrate that auditors in a deliberative mindset are more likely to respond with 
broad, abstract responses.  Combined with the strong support for Hypothesis 1 indicated 
earlier, I provide evidence that auditors in a deliberative mindset have increased 
psychological distance from the evidence they evaluate which could be driving the 
increase in professional skepticism. 
I answer the call for research by Hurtt (2010) by exploring the concept of state 
professional skepticism.  By controlling for an auditor’s trait professional skepticism, I 
show that the differences in professional skepticism displayed by auditors between my 
experimental conditions are due to changes in state professional skepticism.  Thus, I am 
able to link the concept of state professional skepticism with the deliberative mindset and 
show that task-specific instructions can be effective in increasing state skepticism. 
I further contribute to theory and practice by demonstrating the possibility of a 
negative relation between task complexity and professional skepticism.  One possible 
reason why there is not a significantly different number of searches between deliberative 
mindset auditors and my no documentation group auditors is that the increase in 
perceived task difficulty suggested by the deliberative mindset auditors could have 
caused them to end their searches early.  The increased cognitive load introduced by 
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considering the evidence with a deliberative mindset could have been too taxing on the 
auditors.  The ending of the search process for this reason would be inherently unrelated 
to professional skepticism but would be viewed ex post as a display of lower professional 
skepticism (particularly by regulators).  Future research, as described below, can be used 
to test this conjecture. 
6.3 Limitations 
 Every experimental study is subject to limitations and the current study is no 
exception.  First, I lost some experimental control by allowing a few groups of 
participants the ability to complete the experiment on their own time.  As noted earlier, 
there is a difference, albeit an explainable one, in certain demographic variables between 
participants that completed the study on their own and participants that completed the 
study in a controlled setting.  Although I would prefer to have all of the participants 
complete the study in a controlled setting, I find that testing location did not interfere 
with the results.  The results of the study remain unchanged when including testing 
location as a covariate. 
 Second, I believe improvements can be made in the measurement of construal 
levels.  As noted in Section 5.3, participants in the deliberative mindset condition 
demonstrated high construal level scores (?̅? = 6.11 out of a maximum of 8.00) while 
participants in the implemental mindset condition demonstrated lower scores (?̅? = -2.42 
out of a minimum -8.00).  A possible reason why participants in the implemental mindset 
condition did not score lower is that the low-level construals used in the exercise 
developed by Fujita et al. (2006) were too specific.  For example, one situation asked 
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participants about the idea of “making an expensive purchase.”  The wording for the low-
level construal description of this situation, “swiping a credit card,” could have been too 
specific and caused participants to move to the high-level construal option even though 
they might have been thinking with low-level construals in mind.  Creating a better 
measure of construal level will help provide support for the theoretical diagram displayed 
in Figure 2 which predicts the relative time participants will spend in each mindset. 
 Third, participants in the no documentation condition did not have the 
requirement to document evidence.  This difference in the experimental design makes 
comparisons between the no documentation group and the experimental groups more 
difficult, particularly in terms of time spent on the study.  I also potentially lost valuable 
textual comments that could have been entered had I provided textboxes to participants in 
the no documentation condition with minimal instructions to preserve control. 
 Finally, the deliberative mindset intervention increased two variables important in 
an audit setting: time spent on the task and perceived difficulty of the task.  An increase 
in time could be considered inefficient.  I argue that there should not be inefficiency 
issues in the current study because I designed the evidence to suggest that the client’s 
estimate is on the upper end of a reasonable range of values.  However, the current study 
cannot speak to whether there would be an increase in time in an audit situation not 
calling for increased professional skepticism. 
 The increase in perceived task difficulty could suggest that the deliberative 
mindset manipulation increased the cognitive load on participants in that condition.  How 
much the increased in perceived difficulty impacted the study is unclear.  The 
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understanding of this issue is particularly important considering the difficulty already 
inherent in auditing complex estimates (Christensen et al. 2012; Bratten et al. 2013).  
Future research can help tease out whether task difficulty affects professional skepticism. 
6.4 Future Research 
 Potential limitations of a study often lend themselves to excellent future research 
opportunities.  As suggested in the previous section, one future course of study is to test 
the relation between task difficulty and professional skepticism.  More difficult tasks may 
induce higher skeptical action due to the increase in focus required by the higher 
difficulty.  On the other hand, as suggested by the results in this study, higher complexity 
could cause an auditor to prematurely conclude a task, such as searching for audit 
evidence, simply because the task is cognitively draining.  Such an end to the task could 
be later interpreted to mean that the auditor failed to display an appropriate amount of 
professional skepticism. 
 I also see promise in testing whether the increase in professional skepticism 
induced by the deliberative mindset intervention causes a similar increase in professional 
skepticism in a situation not calling for higher professional skepticism.  For example, 
future research could test for increases in skeptical judgments and actions in a situation 
where the client’s estimate is fairly presented.  The deliberative mindset intervention 
could be deemed inefficient if there are increases and the increases are to the level of 
those displayed in the current study. 
 This study shows that documentation instructions can be used to prolong the 
deliberative mindset and increase professional skepticism.  Are there other inexpensive 
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interventions that auditors can employ that will result in similar increases in skepticism?  
One possible option is a decision aid.  A properly designed decision aid could be 
effective in promoting professional skepticism; however, some types of decision aids can 
have the opposite effect and can cause mechanistic behavior (Dowling and Leech 2007; 
Whitecotton et al 1998).  Future research would be useful in developing the proper design 
of such a decision aid. 
 Further, my results provide evidence of a relation between construal level, 
psychological distance, and professional skepticism.  Auditors in the deliberative mindset 
condition displayed higher professional skepticism and were more likely to enter broad, 
abstract responses in their audit documentation.  Future research could potentially use 
this relation to develop an ex post measure of professional skepticism that would be 
useful in demonstrating an auditor’s level of professional skepticism at given points in an 
audit. 
 Finally, future research can attempt to identify mindset/construal levels via 
methods other than those described in this study.  For example, a study can be created 
that uses verbal protocol analysis to help gauge a participant’s mindset level at each step 
of the experimental task.  This type of analysis could prove valuable in identifying the 
specific times in which a person shifts mindsets and will help identify the changes in 
judgments and actions that occur with the shift in mindset. 
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Table 6.1. Hypotheses Summary and Results 
   
Hypothesis Summary Result 
Hypothesis 1a 
Auditors in a deliberative mindset will display 
higher professional skepticism than will auditors 
in an implemental mindset. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 1b 
Auditors in a deliberative mindset will display 
higher professional skepticism than will auditors 
not required to document evidence. 
Mixed Support 
Hypothesis 2 
Auditors in an implemental mindset will display 
lower professional skepticism than auditors not 
required to document evidence. 
Mixed Support 
Hypothesis 3a 
Auditors in a deliberative mindset will be more 
likely to enter broad, abstract responses than will 
auditors in an implemental mindset. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 3b 
Auditors in an implemental mindset will be more 
likely to enter specific, detailed responses than 
will auditors in a deliberative mindset. 
Supported 
  
103 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Alter, A. L., D. M. Oppenheimer, and J. C. Cernla. 2010. Missing the trees for the 
forest: A construal level account of the illusion of explanatory depth. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 99(3): 436-451. 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). 2003. Auditing Fair 
Value Measurements and Disclosures: A Toolkit for Auditors. New York, 
NY: AICPA. 
Anderson, S., and J. Wolfe. 2002. A perspective on audit malpractice claims. 
Journal of Accountancy. 194(3): 59-66. 
Backof, A. G., E. M. Bamber, and T. D. Carpenter. 2011. International financial 
reporting standards and aggressive reporting: An investigation of proposed 
auditor judgment guidance. Working paper, University of Georgia. 
Beasley, M. S., J. V. Carcello, and D. R. Hermanson. 2001. Top 10 audit 
deficiencies. Journal of Accountancy. 191(4): 63-66. 
Bell, T. B., M. E. Peecher, and I. Solomon. 2005. The 21st Century Public 
Company Audit. New York, NY: KPMG LLP. 
Bratten, B., L. M. Gaynor, L. McDaniel, N. R. Montague, and G.E. Sierra. 2013. 
The audit of fair values and other estimates: The effects of underlying 
environmental, task, and auditor-specific factors. Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice & Theory (forthcoming). 
Christensen, B. E., S. M. Glover, and D. A. Wood. 2012. Extreme estimation 
uncertainty in fair value estimates: Implications for audit assurance. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory. 31(1): 127-146. 
Dowling, C. and S. Leech. 2007. Audit support systems and decision aids: 
Current practice and opportunities for future research. International 
Journal of Accounting Information Systems. 8: 92-116. 
Finch, H. 2005. Comparison of the performance of nonparametric and parametric 
MANOVA test statistics when assumptions are violated. Methodology. 
1(1): 27-38. 
104 
 
Freitas, A. L., P. M. Gollwitzer, and Y. Trope. 2004. The influence of abstract and 
concrete mindsets on anticipating and guiding others’ self-regulatory 
efforts. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 40: 739-752. 
Fujita, K., P. M. Gollwitzer, and G. Oettingen. 2007. Mindsets and pre-conscious 
open-mindedness to incidental information. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology. 43: 48-61. 
Fujita, K., M. Henderson, J. Eng, Y. Trope, and N. Liberman. 2006. Spatial 
distance and mental construal of social events. Psychological Science. 17: 
278-282. 
Fujita, K., Y. Trope, N. Liberman, and M. Levin-Sagi. 2006. Construal levels and 
self-control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 90(3): 351-
367. 
Gollwitzer, P. M. 1990. Action phases and mind-sets. In Handbook of Motivation 
and Cognition: Foundations of Social Behavior, edited by E. T. Higgins 
and R. M. Sorrentino. New York: Guilford Press. 53-92. 
Gollwitzer, P. M. and U. Bayer. 1999. Deliberative versus implemental mindsets 
in the control of action. In Dual Process Theories in Social Psychology, 
edited by S. Chaiken and Y. Trope. New York: Guilford Press. 403-422. 
Gollwitzer, P. M., H. Heckhausen, and B. Steller. 1990. Deliberative and 
implemental mind-sets: Cognitive tuning toward congruous thoughts and 
information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 59: 1119-
1127. 
Gollwitzer, P. M. and R. F. Kinney. 1989. Effects of deliberative and implemental 
mind-sets on illusion of control. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology. 56: 531-542. 
Hackenbrack, K. and M. W. Nelson. 1996. Auditors’ incentives and their 
application of financial accounting standards. The Accounting Review. 
71(1): 43-59. 
Harmon-Jones, E. and C. Harmon-Jones. 2002. Testing the action-based model of 
cognitive dissonance: The effect of action orientation on postdecisional 
attitudes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 28: 711-723. 
Haynes, C. M., J. G. Jenkins, and S. R. Nutt. 1998. The relationship between 
client advocacy and audit experience: An exploratory analysis. Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice & Theory. 17(2): 88-104. 
Heckhausen, H. 1986. Why some time out might benefit achievement motivation 
research. In Achievement and Task Motivation, edited by J. H. L. van den 
Bercken, T. C. M. Bergen, and E. E. J. De Bruyn. Lisse, The Netherlands: 
Swets & Zeitlinger. 7-39. 
105 
 
Heckhausen, H. and P. M. Gollwitzer. 1987. Thought contents and cognitive 
functioning in motivational versus volitional states of mind. Motivation & 
Emotion. 11: 101-120. 
Hoaglin, D. C., B. Iglewicz, and J. W. Tukey. 1986. Performance of some 
resistant rules for outlier labeling. Journal of American Statistical 
Association.81: 991-999. 
Huitema, B. E. 2011. The Analysis of Covariance and Alternatives: Statistical 
Methods for Experiments, Quasi-Experiments, and Single-Case Studies. 
(2nd ed.). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Hurtt, R. K. 2010. Development of a scale to measure professional skepticism. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory. 29(1): 149-171.  
Hurtt, R. K., H. L. Brown-Liburd, C. E. Earley, and G. Krishnamoorthy. 2013. 
Research on auditor professional skepticism – Literature synthesis and 
opportunities for future research. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & 
Theory (forthcoming). 
Kadous, K., S. J. Kennedy, and M. E. Peecher. 2003. The effect of quality 
assessment and directional goal commitment on auditors’ acceptance of 
client-preferred accounting methods. The Accounting Review. 73(3): 759-
778. 
Klein, H. J., M. J. Wesson, J. R. Hollenbeck, P. M. Wright, and R. P. DeShon. 
2001. The assessment of goal commitment: A measurement model meta-
analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 85(1): 
32-55. 
Kohlbeck, M. J., J. R. Cohen, and Holder-Webb, L. L. 2009. Auditing intangible 
assets and evaluating fair market value: The case of reacquired franchise 
rights. Issues in Accounting Education. 24(1): 45-61. 
Landis, J. R. and G. G. Koch. 1977. The measurement of observer agreement for 
categorical data. Biometrics. 33(1): 159-174. 
Louwers, T. J., R. J. Ramsay, D. H. Sinason, J. R. Strawser, and J. C. Thibodeau. 
2011. Auditing & Assurance Services. (5th ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-
Hill Irwin. 
Lundgren, S. R. and R. Prislin. 1998. Motivated cognitive processing and attitude 
change. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 24(7): 715-726. 
Meyvis, T., K. Goldsmith, and R. Dhar. 2012. The importance of the context in 
brand extension: How pictures and comparisons shift consumers’ focus 
from fit to quality. Journal of Marketing Research. 49(2): 206-217. 
106 
 
Montague, N. R. 2010. The effects of directional audit guidance on auditor 
confirmation bias and professional skepticism when evaluating fair value 
estimates. (Dissertation). 
Nelson, M. W. 2009. A model and literature review of professional skepticism in 
auditing. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory. 28(2): 1-34. 
Ng, T. B. P. and H. T. Tan. 2003. Effects of authoritative guidance availability 
and audit committee effectiveness on auditors’ judgments in an auditor-
client negotiation context. The Accounting Review. 78(3): 801-818. 
PCAOB. 2004. Audit Documentation. PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 3. 
Washington, D.C.: PCAOB. 
PCAOB. 2008. Report on the PCAOB’s 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 inspections 
of domestic annually inspected firms. PCAOB Release No. 2007-008. 
Retrieved January 25, 2012 from the World Wide Web: 
http://pcaobus.org/Inspections/Pages/PublicReports.aspx 
PCAOB. 2012. Due Professional Care in the Performance of Work. AU Section 
230. Retrieved January 25, 2012 from the World Wide Web: 
http://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/AU230.aspx 
PCAOB. 2012. Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. AU 
Section 316. Retrieved January 25, 2012 from the World Wide Web: 
http://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/AU316.aspx 
PCAOB. 2012. Auditing Accounting Estimates. AU Section 342. Retrieved 
January 25, 2012 from the World Wide Web: 
http://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/AU342.aspx 
Peecher, M. E. 1996. The influence of auditors’ justification processes on their 
decisions: A cognitive model and experimental evidence. Journal of 
Accounting Research. 34(1): 125-140. 
Piercey, M. D. 2011. Documentation requirements and quantified versus 
qualitative audit risk assessments. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & 
Theory. 30(4): 223-248. 
Rim, S., J. S. Uleman, and Y. Trope. 2009. Spontaneous trait inference and 
construal level theory: Psychological distance increases nonconscious trait 
thinking. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 45(5): 1088-1097. 
Schmeichel, B. J. and K. Vohs. 2009. Self-affirmation and self-control: Affirming 
core values counteracts ego depletion. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology. 96(4): 770-782. 
Schmider, E., M. Ziegler, E. Danay, L. Beyer, and M. Bühner. 2010. Is it really 
robust? Reinvestigating the robustness of ANOVA against violations of 
the normal distribution assumption. Methodology. 6(4): 147-151. 
107 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 2008. Final Report of the Advisory 
Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting (CIFiR) to the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission. Available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oca/acifr/acifr-finalreport.pdf. 
Shaub, M. K. 1996. Trust and suspicion: The effects of situational and 
dispositional factors on auditors’ trust of clients. Behavioral Research in 
Accounting. 8: 154-174. 
Sheskin, D. 2004. Handbook of Parametric and Nonparametric Statistical 
Procedures. (3rd edition). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press LLC. 
Stevens, J. 1986. Applied Multivariate Statistics for the Social Sciences. Hillsdale, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Taylor, S. E. and P. M. Gollwitzer. 1995. Effects of mindsets on positive 
illusions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 69: 213-226. 
Trope, Y. and N. Liberman. 2003. Temporal construal. Psychological Review. 
110(3): 403-421. 
Trope, Y. and N. Liberman. 2010. Construal-level theory of psychological 
distance. Psychological Review. 117(2): 440-463.  
Whitecotton, S.M., D. E. Sanders, and K. B. Norris. 1998. Improving predictive 
accuracy with a combination of human intuition and mechanical decision 
aids. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 76(3): 
325-348. 
 
  
108 
 
 
APPENDIX A – IRB APPROVAL LETTER 
 
109 
 
  
110 
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Experiment Instructions 
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Client Information  
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Audit Information  
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First Evidence Screen (No Documentation Condition)
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First Evidence Screen (Deliberative Mindset Condition)  
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First Evidence Screen (Implemental Mindset Condition)  
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Second Screen of Evidence (No Documentation Condition) 
*Note that the deliberative mindset and implemental mindset conditions still have the 
requirements to document audit evidence shown on their respective screens. 
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Third Screen of Evidence (No Documentation Condition) 
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Fourth Screen of Evidence (No Documentation Condition) 
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Fifth (Final) Screen of Evidence (No Documentation Condition) 
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Dependent Variables  
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Hurtt Professional Skepticism Scale  
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Covariates  
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Goal Congruence Questions  
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Construal Level Questionnaire 
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Demographic Information 
